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SITUATION II 
NEUTRALITY AND TERRITORIAL WATERS 
States X and Y are at war. Other states are neutral. 
State R has forbidden submarines to enter its territorial 
'vaters, except in case of distress; or to pass through its 
straits and archipelagoes, except on the surface and un-
der the condition that no belligerent activities take place 
'vithin such areas. 
(a) An air reconnaissance is being maintained ahead 
of a part of the fleet of X, which, in passing through a 
strait, bet,veen an islet and State R, 6 miles wide at either 
entrance but wider in the middle, sights on the surface a 
submarine of Y on the landward side of the islet, but 
3Yz 1niles from land in a favorable position to attack the 
vessels of X. ( 1) Should the aircraft attack the sub-
nlarine ~ (2) vVould the situation be changed if a 
cruiser of State R is near~ 
(b) The land of R consists of large islands, separated 
by wide channels or sounds whose shores are all under the 
jurisdiction of R. These channels or sounds contain 
nu1nerous relatively small islands, islets, and barrier 
reefs, inclosing, in places, large areas of navigable wa-
ters. Some of the entrances are narrow and navigable. 
Some are wide, and not safely navigable due to sand 
bars, reefs, and shoals. 
At a point 7 miles from any land of R, the vessels of 
X refuel from a commercial tanker of State X. From 
this area the only navigable channels are between islands 
belonging to R not more than 6 miles a part. An aircraft 
of Y sees this refueling and demands that all the vessels 
concerned be interned. 
What action should be taken? 
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(a) ( 1) The aircraft o£ X should not attack the sub-
marine o£ Y unless on grounds other than mere pres-
ence o£ the submarine in the strait o£ R. 
(2) The presence o£ the cruiser o£ State R would 
make it more imperative that any attack by the aircraft 
o£ X upon the submarine o£ Y should be based upon 
some hostile act o£ the submarine o£ Y. 
~ (b) State R should intern the vessels o£ State X i£ 
L they are or have been using the waters o£ R as a base. 
Historical bays.-During the seventeenth century there 
were many differences o£ opinion upon the subject. o£ 
the lin1its o£ maritime jurisdiction. Extreme claims 
were made by some states and denied by others. The 
claims later made by the United States were not always 
consistent, save that a minimu1n o£ 3 miles has always 
been maintained. 
States have, however, generally maintained that jur-
isdiction beyond the 3-mile limit might be exercised £or 
specific purposes as fishing, revenue purposes, etc. 
Admiral Sperry's attitude, 1907.-Admiral Sperry, a 
former president o£ this Naval War College, and dele-
gate plenipotentiary to the Second Hague Peace Confer-
ence in 1907 as member o£ the committee o£ examination 
upon the convention on the laying o£ automatic con-
tact mines, when the question o£ the extent o£ territorial 
waters within which mines might be laid was under 
consideration, explained that the American proposal had 
a voided mentioning any limit on area. He said: 
The omission in the proposal of the delegation of the United 
States of America relative to submarine mines of a definite re-
striction on the places where they may be laid is not due to any 
sympathy whatever with the general use of n1ines beyond ter-
ritorial waters, a means which in common with the whole civilized 
world it condemns, but for quite other considerations. 
The term territorial waters is perhaps no more certain in its 
application than measured limits; but the naval delegate of the 
United States is not prepared to say that a limitation in one way -
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or another would not affect the right to defend the 4,000 miles 
of continental coast of the United States at certain points which 
must be approached through a winding channel between sub-
merged reefs, far from the shore, where some mines would ab-
solutely prevent access. In one island of the Philippines that is 
surrounded by reefs there is a large bay with land on all sides, 
which would shelter the fleet of the greatest Power. 
The Powers that are here represented have vast rich possessions 
in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, where the harbours and islands 
are protected by coral reef barriers, with only here and there a 
passage that may or may not be less than 10 or even a hundred 
miles from the mainland. 
The reefs may or may not be exposed at low tide. Where is 
the low-water mark? Has it been decided that all waters inside 
of reefs are territorial waters? Shall the 3 miles be measured 
from the reefs and beyond? The coast of Australia is fringed 
for more than a thousand miles by the Great Barrier Reef at a 
distance of from 20 to 150 miles from the shore. Inside this reef, 
where there is only an occasional passage, there exists a labryinth 
of lesser reefs and islets, but in the thousand miles the largest 
vessels can navigate in security under the guidance of a pilot. 
It is not necessary for a ship going to an Australian port to pass 
inside, and the interior waters can hardly be considered as form-
ing a part of the high seas. It is not within the knowledge of the 
delegate of the United States whether they are so considered; but 
it seems doubtful that the nationals of that great and rich com-
munity would voluntarily abandon \Vhat might be almost a per-
fect defence of important l}()ints. · 
Many Powers represented here have vast colonial empires 
whose coasts are protected by almost perfect ramparts of coral, 
as all naval officers know, and it would be well to consider with 
care the possible effects of any conventional provision that we 
might agree upon, and that when once made would be difficult to 
denounce. (Reports to The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, 
1917, pp. 664-665.) 
The committee of examination adhered to the 3-mile 
limit but the commission omitted the articles which re-
ferred to limits of area and these articles were not in-
serted in the convention. 
Ouba.-Around some parts of Cuba there are reefs, 
rocks, and keys and about the 1:9iddle of the nineteenth 
century Spain made claims to extended jurisdiction 
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along the Cuban coast. These claims gave rise to much 
correspondence between the United States and Spain. 
Secretary Seward in 1863 referring to the Spanish 
claim of a 6-mile coast jurisdictionA and the argument 
based on the nature of the outlying islets, etc., said: 
This ground is, that the shore of Cuba is, by reason of its 
islets and smaller rocks, such as to require that the maritime 
jurisdiction of Cuba, in order to purposes of effective defense, 
and police, should be extended to the breadth of 6 miles. The 
undersigned has examined what are supposed to be accurate 
charts of the coast of Cuba, and if he is not n1isled by some 
error of the chart, or of the process of examination, he has 
ascertained that nearly half of the coast of Cuba is practically 
free from reefs, rocks, and keys, and that the seas adjacent 
to that part of the island which includes the great harbors of 
Cabanos, Havana, Matanzas, and Santiago are very deep, while 
in fact the greatest depth of the passage between Cuba and 
Florida is found within 5 miles of the coast of Cuba, off the har-
bor of Havana. 
The undersigned has further ascertained, as he thinks, that 
the line of keys which confront other portions of the Cuban 
coast resemble, in dimensions, constitution and vicinity to the 
mainland, the keys which lie off the southern Florida coast 
of the United States. The undersigned assumes that this line 
of keys is properly to be regarded as the exterior coast ,line, 
and that the inland jurisdiction ceases there, while the mari-
time jurisdiction of Spain begins from the exterior sea front of 
those keys. 
In view of the considerations and facts which have been 
thus presented, the undersigned is obliged to state that the 
Government of the United States is not prepared to admit that 
the jurisdiction of Spain in the waters which surround the 
island of Cuba lawfully and rightly extends beyond the customary 
limit of 3 miles. (1 Moore, International Law Digest, p. 711.) 
In 1869, Secretary Fish in a note to the Secretary of 
the Navy said: 
The maritime jurisdiction of Spain may be acknowledged to 
extend not only to a marine league beyond the coast of Cuba 
itself, but also to the same distance from the coast line of 
the several islets or keys with 'vhich Cuba itself is surrounded. 
Any acts of Spanish authority within that line can not be called 
into question, provided they shall not be at variance with law 
or treaties. (Ibid., p. 713.) 
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The Spanish claim to a 6-mile jurisdiction around the 
coast of Cuba was involved in the discussion in 1864 be-
tween the British charge and Mr. Seward as to an 
international agree1nent for a 6-mile limit but no action 
\Vas taken. 
Sweden.-The coast of S\veden both within its for-
mer and present limits has given rise to many questions 
of jurisdiction. 'fhe islands off the Swedish coast in-
close \Vaters of varying widths. Whether the waters 
land \Yard of son1e of these coast islands or inclosed by 
some of these islands should be regarded as closed sea 
has been a matter of difference of opinion. Swedish 
legislation has sometimes referred ·to certain of these 
islands as archipelagoes bounding closed seas. The de-
cree of December 20, 1912, speaking of Swedish inner 
territorial \Vaters referred to \Vaters between or within 
islands, islets, or reefs not continually submerged. Man-
ifestly this is not sufficiently explicit for all cases \vhich 
may arise off the coast of Sweden as some islands are a 
long distance from the coast, but the purpose of the 
legislation see1ned to be roughly to assimilate the juris-
diction over \Vaters within archipelagoes to \Vaters \vithin 
bays. 
Scandinavian decrees.-Denmark, Norway, and 
Sweden agreed upon rules for neutrality in 1912 (1917, 
Naval vVar College, International La,v Documents, p. 
183) and provided that changes of the rules should be 
n1ade only after sufficient notice to permit an exchange 
of vie\vs on the matter. 
A S\vedish decree of July 19, 1916, provided that-
Submarines belonging to foreign powers and equipped for use 
in warfare may not navigate or lie in Swedish territorial waters 
within 3 nautical minutes (5,556 meters) from land or from 
extreme outlying skerries, which are not continuously washed 
over by the sea, under peril of being attacked by arn1ed force 
without previous warning; exception is, however, made for the 
passage through Oresund between parallels of latitude drawn 
in the north, through Viking Light (lat., north 56° 8' 7"), and, 
in the south, through IGagshamm Light (lat., north 55° 31' 2''). 
38 NEUTRALITY AND TERRITORIAL WATERS 
In the event of a submarine being compelled through ba<l 
\veather or shjp\vreck to enter the forbidden area, the above reg-
ulation is not applicable, always provided that the vessel while 
within the mentioned area, shall remain above the surface and 
fly its national flag as \Yell as the international signal indicating 
the cause of its presence. The vessel shall leave the area as soon 
as possible after the reason for its presence there has ceased 
to exist. (Ibid., p. 215.) 
The British authorities saw in this Swedish decree 
an evidence of a marked difference in the attitude 
adopted " towards the two belligerent parties and this 
difference seems incompatible with the obligations of a 
true and impartial neutrality." (Parliamentary Papers, 
Misc. No. 8 (1917), p. 3.) The Swedish authorities re-
sented this imputation saying "every submarine is 
treated as a belligerent submarine unless its employ-
ment for commercial purposes is definitely proved by 
known facts." (Ibid., p. 4.) Further notes were ex-
changed as was customary at this period of the war. 
Instructions and regulations prior t·o 1914.-Before 
the World War instructions, regulations, and decrees 
had been issued in regard to the use of territorial vvaters 
and aerial space. France by decree of October 19, 1912, 
provided for the application of XIII Hague Conven-
tion of 1907 that the territorial waters of France 1nay 
be considered to extend 6 miles from the lovv-water 1nark 
as a zone of neutrality and the Minister of Marine on 
December 19, 1912, stated that territorial waters of neu-
trals should never be considered to extend less than 3 
miles from the coast or islands or reefs dependent on 
the coasts. Italy by a decree of August 20, 1909, an-
nounced that in case of war it vvould establish a 10-mile 
neutrality zone. Other decrees and proclamations con-
tained varying provisions as to mariti1ne jurisdiction. 
Norwegian territorial waters.-By a royal decree of 
June 29, 1911, a commission of three was named to 1nake 
an investigation in regard to the maritime frontier of 
Finmarken. In its report the co1nmission referred to 
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the letters patent o:f February 25, 1812, 1n 'vhich the 
king had said: 
N ous voulons a voir stipule com me regle dans to us les cas oil 
il est question de delimitation de la frontiere de notre souver· 
ainete sur les eaux territoriales, que celle-ci doit etre comptee 
jusqu'a la distance d'une lieue marine ordinaire de l'ile ou l'ilot 
le plus eloigne de la terre qui n'est pas recouvert par la mer. 
(Rapport du 29 Fevrier 1912 de la Commission da la Frontiere 
Des Ea ux Territoriales. Pt. I, 1912, p. 3.) 
N or,vay also enacted 1nany la,vs regulating fisheries 
within a league o:f the coast or coastal lands covered by 
the sea. 
* * * sur les mers baignant les tCotes des deux provinces 
jusqu'a la distance d'une lieue geographique de la terre, a compter 
de l'ile ou l'ilot le plus eloigne que ne soit pas recouvert par la 
mer ; (Ibid., p. 3.) 
This regulation of the distance had existed long before 
the union o:f Norway and Sweden, and in earlier days 
during the union 'vith Denmark wider areas had also 
been claimed. Such claims had also been made at other 
times. 
The 'vaters along the coast and about the islands o:f 
Norway afford examples o:f the varied geographical con-
figurations and conditions but the expression determining 
the limit o:f territorial jurisdiction was often " a league 
:from the coast reckoned :from an island or islet which is 
most remote and not covered by the sea." While there 
'vas not much difficulty in identifying island, islet, and 
rock, there was some difficulty in interpreting " qui ne 
sont pas reconverts par le mer ". Questions arose as to 
'vhether this should be interpreted as exposed at high 
tide, exposed at low tide, at mean low tide, or sometimes 
exposed. The drift o:f opinion seems to have been :for 
Scandinavian coasts that any rock or reef not constantly 
submerged would be regarded as the territory o:f the 
state :from which the limit o:f territorial waters should be 
measured. 
In 1919 the United States Government issued a vol-
ume entitled "The Extent of the Marginal Sea" pre-
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pared by Henry G. Crocker. This volume contained a 
translation o£ so1ne o£ the Report o£ the N or,vegian 
Commission, in part as £ollo,vs: 
In the opinion of the present Com1nission, the terms of the 
letters patent admit of only one certain solution, which is that 
rocks 'vhich are always under water must not be taken into 
consideration in any case. But the words in thernselves n1ay 
mean " which are never under water," " which are not usually 
under water," "which are not generally under water," "which 
are not continually under water," "which are not under water 
all the time," and according to any of these and mauy other in-
terpretations; they may be used in the se!lse of high and low 
tide, at ordinary times or at the tin1e of spring tides, or in the 
~ense of the mean sea level so as to include or exclude rocks 
of a totally different character from those that are under water 
at high tide at the time of spring tides to those which at such 
times are above water at low tide. 
There being no indication in the wording of the text itself, 
the most equitable method is for the Commission to draw its 
own conclusions based upon the following consiclera tions: the 
rescript of June 18, 1745, where the term "shoals" (hauts-fonds) 
appears alongside of the term " rocks," leads to the belief that 
the boundary line is to be nwasured from the rocks which are 
not continually under water, and subsequent rescripts certainly 
did not have in view any modification in this respect; construed 
in this way, the different rescripts relating to the one league 
boundary line lay the minimum of restriction upon the old claim 
of a more extensive boundary. If the expressions used in the 
letters patent, which· carne later, are equivocal, they must pref-
erably be given the meaning which agrees with the old right, 
and the words "which are not under water" must be inter-
preted as excluding rocks which are always under water. * * * 
It n1ay be asked whether we should take into consideration any 
rock at all, whatever its distance frmn shore and place the 
boundary line of our territorial waters one league beyond it. The 
letters patent lay down no restrictions, neither can an order of 
this nature-it does not attempt to trace the boundary line in all 
its details along the coast-undertake to give exact indications ou 
this subject. 
It would seem, howeYer, to be equitable to take into account, in 
any event, rocks that are not more than two geographical leagues 
distant. If a circle with a one league radius be drawn around 
such a rock (the width fixed upon for the territorial sea), this 
circle will touch a line drawn the same distance from the coast. 
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It may also happen-and this is indeed the case with our 
country-that there are certain rocks strung out from shore and 
so closely connected therewith that the boundary line must Inani-
festly be placed one league beyond the farthest out, as the letters 
patent proYhle. 
If there is an isolated rock at a greater distance than two 
leagues fro1n land, its importance must of course be determined 
according to the circumstances. 
If it should be necessary to lay down in principle what rocks 
along the coast are to be considered as "the farthest out," the 
method most in conformity \Vith the terms of the letters patent 
of 1812-which make the boundary line pass beyond the most 
distant islands and islets and do not even mention the coast 
line of the mainland-would be to consider as Norwegian the 
entire area of the sea between these rocks and the shore and to 
extend the boundary line of the territorial \Vaters one league 
beyond the straight lines drawn from rock to rock. If the pro-
vision of the law gives any indication, it would seem to be that 
its intention is to consider the islands and islets as so many 
connecting points of the basic lines. In this \vay we obviate 
in general the necessity of drawing the boundary line in the 
shape of an arc beyond the rocks (or in the shape of semicircles 
around them with a one league radius), as well as of drawing 
a complete circle around a particular rock which is given a parcel 
of territorial sea separate from the rest of the zone. 
How far apart, however, should two of " the most distant " 
rocks be to admit of the drawing of such a connecting line, from 
which the boundary of the territorial \Vaters shall be measured? 
Lines should be drawn, at any rate between rocks that are not 
nwre than two leagues apart). but it will be necessary to con-
sider the particular circumstances in each instance. 
'Ve must pu1·sue the same course when it is a question of 
determining the boundary line off the coast where the " skjaer-
gaard " begins and .whe1·e the coast assumes the character of a 
fjord at whose entrance there are rocks. 
The various circumstances to be taken into consideration in 
each particular instance may be of a historical, an economic or 
a geographical nature; for example, a time-honored conception 
with regard to the boundary, and undisturbed possession of 
fisheries carried on by the population along the coast since time 
immemorial and necessary to its existence; the practical ad-. 
vantages of a line easy to ascertain on the spot ; the natural 
boundaries of fishing banks. ( 01·ocker, The Extent of the 
l\larginal Sea. 1919, pp. 613-616.) 
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Differing neutrality rules .-Neutrality proclamations 
are not uniform. One state may even prescribe more 
stringent regulations for one part of its dominions than 
for another part. The geography and other conditions 
may influence the character of the regulations, i. e., a 
state may prescribe certain regulations for its main-
land while making different regulations for its remote 
dependencies. The Netherlands announced in 1914 more 
stringent regulations for entrance to its continental ter-
ritorial waters by belligerent vessels of war than for 
such entrance to the waters of its oversea possessions. 
Owing to the comparatively recent use of the air by 
aircraft, the rules are less well established than for ter-
ritorial waters. Uncertainty as to the possible use of the 
air by belligerents during the World War led neutrals 
to enunciate rules that may have been more extreme than 
neutrality requires. This seems to have been true in re-
gard to submarines when the rules proposed by the 
Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 
1921-22, are compared with those adopted by the Lon-
don Conference in 1930. 
It may; therefore, be open to question whether the 
dirigible belonging to a belligerent air force should be 
subject to special restrictions in a neutral airport to 
any greater degree than a belligerent cruiser in a mari-
time port. It is true that there has always been a tend-
ency to put special restrictions upon novel means of war-
fare. It may, however, not be any more logical to re-
trict aircraft specially because of speed or the use of 
the air than specially to restrict fast cruisers or subma-
rines on account of speed or use of novel methods of 
navigation. The hydroplane may be part of the time 
upon the surface of the water and part of the time above 
and the submarine may similarly be on and below the 
surface. 
It is true that the Commission of Experts in 1923 
drew up regulations at The Hague placing special disa-
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bilities upon aircraft by stringent li1nitations in tin1e of 
war. The feeling at that ti1ne was still influenced by 
events of the 'Vorld "\Var and aircraft were not so widely 
and generally used as in later years. I~ 1899 the dis-
charge of projectiles and explosives from aircraft for a 
period of five years was prohibited by a declaration 
drawn up at The Hague and this declaration was gen-
erally ratified. A declaration in 1907 to like effect to 
extend to the close of the Third Peace Conference, pro-
posed for but not held in 1915, was not even signed by 
some of the leading states. 
rrhe Hague regulations of 1923 have not been ratified 
and probably " rould require extended modification to 
1neet present conditions. Aircraft are much more com-
Inonly used than in 1923. Regular routes are establish·~d. 
~1ails are regularly dispatched by aircraft. Passengers 
rely on air service to reach their destinations on time. 
If there are to be neutrals in time of war, their rights 
should be entitled to respect and neutrals should be en-
titled to communicate with the belligerents in the custom-
ary manner save they must not be of either party in the 
war. 
S peoial provisions .-vVhile there is a general support 
of the 3-mile limit of jurisdiction over the marginal sea 
at the present time, there are many states which claim 
wider jurisdiction. Some states make these wider claims 
on grounds of long practice, some on geographical con-
figura~ion and others on special national grounds. The 
United States has negotiated a large nu1nber of treaties 
regarding the suppression of the traffic in alcoholic 
liquors in which there are expressions showing that the 
parties intend " to uphold the principle that 3 marine 
miles extending from the coastline outwards and meas-
ured from low-water mark constitute the proper limits 
of territorial waters." Some states have negotiated such 
treaties with. the proviso that "The High Contracting 
Parties respectively retain their rights and claims, with-
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out prejudice by reason o:f this agreement, with respect 
to the extent o:f their territorial jurisdiction." Frane~, 
vvhich has such a proviso, has maintained that it vvould 
be difficult to reach an agreement on the breadth o:f terri-
torial vvaters saying : 
The political, economic and social interests of coastal States 
are not only different, but often conflicting, on account of the 
position and geographical configuration of the territory and coasts 
of those States. (Conference for the Codification of International 
Law, Vol. II, Territorial 'Vaters, League of Nations, C. 74, l\1. 
39, 1929, v' p. 28.) 
The "Anna,," 1805.-An early case showed the sound-
ness o:f Sir William Scott's (Lord Sto-well) reasoning 
even when considering a :foreign state. In the case o:f 
the Anna, 1805, he said: 
The capture was made, it seems, at the mouth of the Missis-
sippi, and, as it is contended in the claim, within the boundaries 
of the United States. We all know that the rule of law on this 
subject is "terrae dominium finitur, ubi finitur arntorum vis," 
and since the introduction of firearms, that distance has usually 
been recognjzed to be about 3 miles from the shore. But it so 
happens in this case, that a question arises as to what is to be 
deemed the shore, since there are a nutnber of little mud islands 
composed of earth and trees drifted down by the River, which 
form a kind of portico to the main land. It is contended that 
these are not to be considered as any part of the terri tory of 
America, that they are a sort of " no mans land," not of con-
sistency enough to support the purposes of life, uninhabited and 
resorted to, only, for shooting and taking birds nests. It is 
argued that the line of territory is to be taken only from the 
I 
Balise, which is a fort raised on made land by the· former 
Spanish possessors. I am of a different opinion; I think that 
the protection of territory is to be reckoned from these islands; 
and that they are the natural apendages of · the coast on 
which they border, and from which indeed they are formed, 
Their elements are derived ilnmecliately from the territory, and 
on the principle of alluvium and incren1ent, on \Vhich so much 
is to be found in the books of law, Quod vis ftuntinis de tuo 
praedia detraxerit, a Vicino praed,io attulerit, palam tUU111 
r emanet, even if it had been carried over to an adjoining ter-• ritory. Consider what the consequence would be if lands of 
this description were not considered as appendant to the main-
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land, and as comprized within the bounds of territory·. If they 
do not belong to the United States of America, any other power 
might occupy them; they might be embanked and fortified. 
'Vhat a thorn would this be in the side of America! It is phys-
ically possible at least that they might be so occupied by European 
nations, and then the command of the River would be no longer 
in America, but in such settlements. The possibility of such a 
consequence is enough to expose the fallacy of any arguments 
that are addressed to shew, that these islands are not to be con-
sidered as part of the territory of America. 'Vhether they are 
eomposed of earth or solid rock, will not Yary the right of do-
minion, for the right of dominion does not depend upon the 
texture of the soil. 
I am of opinion that the right of territory is to be reckoned 
from those islands. That being established, it is not denied 
that the actual capture took place within the distance of 3 miles 
from the islands, and at the very threshold of the river. (5 C. 
Robinson, Admiralty Report, pp. 373, 385b.) 
British position, 192.1;.-In reply to the questionnaire 
sent out by the League of Nations preparatory to the 
Conference for the Codification of International Law 
differing replies were received. As to the breadth of 
territorial waters, Great Britain, saying that the Brit-
ish Govern1nent made no claim to exercise jurisdiction 
beyond the 3-mile limit, nevertheless, stated: · 
There are certain banks outside the 3-mile limit off the coasts 
of various British dependencies on whicll sedentary fisheries 
of oysters, pearl oysters, chanks or beches de mer on the sea 
bottom are practised, and which have by long usage come to be 
regarded as the subject of occupation and property. The fore-
going answer is not intended to exclude claims to the sedentary 
fisheries on these banks. The question is understood to relate 
only to claims to exercise rights over the waters of the high seas. 
(d) Claims by foreign States to exercise rights of jurisdiction 
or reontrol over the waters of the high seas adjacent to the belt 
of territorial 'vaters of those States have never been admitted 
and have always been objected to by His Majesty's Government 
in Great Britain. 
His l\Iajesty's Government admit that the speed of 1nodern 
vessels and aircraft and the immense range and power of mod-
ern implements of warfare may render a belt of 3 miles insuf-
ficient to prevent injurious consequences resulting in the national 
territory from acts which have taken place on the high seas, 
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but this affords no sufficient argument for a change in the 3-mile 
limit. To ensure that no injurious consequence should result 
'vithin the national territory from an act which has taken place 
on the high seas, it would be necessary to establish a belt so 
wide as to constitute a serious encroachment on the high seas. 
A belt of such width would lead to perpetual disputes. The 
difficulty of determining with accuracy ·whether a vessel is 
\vithin the coastal belt would be increased very largely if the 
width of that belt were increased, as the greater the distance 
from the shore the more difficult it is to fix by reference to the 
shore the exact position of the vessel. Furthermore, the burden 
imposed on neutral States in time of war would be intolerable. 
His Majesty's Government accept the view that no State can be 
expecled to tolerate 'vith equanimity circumstances arising un-
der which, owing to peculiar local circumstances, the absen<;e of 
jurisdiction over foreign vessels on the high seas immediately 
contiguous to its territorial waters may prejudice gravely the 
enforcement of the laws or the well-being of the community 
within its territory. 
'\Vhere such circun1stances arise, it is the duty of any foreign 
State to come to an agreement enabling the State concerned to 
exercise such rights of control over the merchant vessels of the 
foreign State concluding the agreement as may be necessary. 
For a State to refuS'e to enter into an agreement of this kind 
would be to show an entire absence of the consideration for the 
ri~hts of other States upon which the solidarity of nations de-
pends. (Conference for the Codification of International Law, 
Vol. II, Territorial '\Vaters, League of Nations, C. 74, M. 39, 1929, 
v, p. 28.) 
India assumed the same position, and Australia said: 
They make no claim to exercise rights over the high seas out-
side the belt of territorial waters. This answer is made on the 
understanding that the question relates only to claims to exer-
cise sovereign rights over the 'vaters of the high seas, and does 
not relate to claims to exercise jurisdiction over sedentary fish-
eries for pearl oysters and b~ches de mer, etc., on certain portions 
of the sea bottom outside the 3-mile limit which by long usage 
have come to be regarded as the subject of occupation and prop-
erty. (Ibid., p. 24.) 
Hague Report, 1923.-The Report of the Commission 
of Jurists, 1923, appointed to consider new agencies of 
warfare submitted certain rules that have not been rati-
fied but are the latest expression of the result of of-
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ficial international deliberation. Articles 4 7 and 48 of 
these rules provide : 
"A neutral State is bound to take such steps as the means at its 
disposal permit to prevent within its jurisdiction aerial obser-
vation of the movements, operations or defences of one belliger-
ent, with the intention of informing the other belligerent." 
The prohibition of aerial observation within neutral terri-
tory on belligerent account must apply equally to the case of 
aircraft on board belligerent warships when in neutral waters. 
To avoid all misconception on this point, the following para-
graph has been added: 
"This provision applies equally to a belligerent military air-
craft on board a vessel of 'var." 
The measures which a neutral Government may be obliged to 
take to compel respect for its rights may entail the use of force; 
fire may have to be opened on foreign aircraft, even military 
aircraft of another State. Following the analogy of article 10 
of Convention V of 1907 (Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers 
in Land 'Var) and article 26 of Convention XIII (Rights and 
Duties of Neutral Powers in :i\1aritime War), it has been thought 
well to declare that the measures, even of force, taken by a 
neutral Power for this purpose cannot be regarded as acts of war. 
Still less could they be regarded as unfriendly acts, seeing that 
they are taken in specific exercise of rights conferred or recognised 
by treaty. 
It may be well to add that the neutral Government will not be 
responsible for any injury or damage done to the aircraft or 
other object. 
" ARTICLE 48 
"The action of a neutral Power in using force or other means 
at its disposal in the exercise of its rights or duties under these 
rules cannot be regarded as a hostile act." (1924, Naval War 
College, International Law Documents, p. 136.) 
The report of the co1nmission had also referred to 
differences in the proposed limits of airspacf3 and terri-
torial waters saying: 
On principle it would seem that the jurisdiction in the air-
space should be appurtenant to the territorial jurisdiction en-
joyed beneath it, and that in the absence of a territorial juris-
diction beneath, there is no sound basis for jurisdiction in the 
air. (Ibid., p. 152.) 
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League of Nations committee, 19~6.-The League of 
Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive 
Codification of International La,v in 1926 communi-
cated the report of a subcommittee on the la 'v of ter-
ritorial waters to the governments. The subcon1mittee 
stated that " The question of territorial 'vaters involves 
a number of difficult problems of international law." 
The subcommittBe found that many attempts had been 
1nade to formulate the law of territorial waters and that 
1nost diverse theories had been put forward upon the 
subject. 
League of Nations draft, 1926.-The draft of a con-
vention as submitted by Professor Schiicking after dis-
cussion with the committee of experts appointed by the 
League of Nations as prepatory to the codification of 
the law of territorial waters, after escaping the 3-mile 
limit for coast waters and the 10-mile limit for bays, con-
tained the following : 
ARTICLE 5 
Islands 
If there are natural islands, not continuously submerged, sit-
uated off a coast, the inner zone of the sea shall be measured 
from these islands, except in the event of their being so far 
distant from the mainland that they would not come within the 
zone of the territorial sea if such zone were measured from the 
mainland. In such case, the island shall have a special terri-
torial sea for itself. 
In the case of archipelagoes, the constituent islands are con-
sidered as forming a whole and the width of the territorial sea 
• shall be measured from the islands most distant from the centre 
of the archipelago. 
ARTICLE 6 
Straits 
The regime of straits at present subject to special conventions 
is reserved. In straits of which both shores belpng to the same 
State, the sea shall be territorial, even if the distance between 
the shores exceeds 10 miles, provided that that distance is not 
exceeded at either entrance to the Strait. (League of Nations 
Document, C. 196, 1\'l. 70, 1927, V. p. 72.) 
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Attitude of Portugal, 1926.-In replying to the 
League of Nations questionnaire as to territorial 'vaters 
1n 1926, the Portuguese Government said: 
Article V. If there are natural islands, not continuously sub-
merged, situated off a coast at a distance fr01n the coast not 
above 24 miles, the zone of the territorial sea shall be n1easured 
.crmn these islands. 'Vhen the distance of the islands from the 
.!Oast is above 24 miles, these islands shall have a territorial sea 
for themselves, as if they were part of the mainland. 
In the case of an archipelago, the component islands shall be 
considered as forming a whole, and the width of the territoria~ 
sea shall be measured from the islands most distant from the 
centre of the archipelago (see Observations). (League of Nations 
Documents, C. 196, l\1. 70, 19-27, V [C. P. D. I. 95 ( 2) J, p. 189.) 
The observations to which reference is made are as 
follows: 
Portugal is unable to forego a very much wider limit to her 
territorial waters than 3 miles, since it is absolutely necessary 
for her to preserve the species of fish which inhabit her waters, 
these fisheries contributing largely towarc~s the feeding of her 
population and the employment of her industries. If these spe-
cies become rare or disappear Portugal's economic crisis, which 
is already acute, will be considerably aggravated. 
'Vhat is true of Portugal is also true of many other coun-
tries and therefore this clailn does not constitute a special 
case. This extended Hmit has indeed become an established 
usage in Portugal and in other countries, and is embodied in 
the legislations of Portugal and various nations, as was first 
pointed out in detail by the distinguished Professor ShUcking 
in his 1nasterly report to the Committee of Experts for the 
Progressive Codification of International Law. Beyond doubt, 
the present needs of the nations are of more ilnportance than 
traditions and ancient usage, and therefore Portugal demands 
the extension to 12 miles of the limit of territorial ·waters, as 
being more in conformity with present practice and the present 
needs of the majority of States. If, however, for one reason 
or another, this extension is impossible, Portugal considers that 
a minimum limit of 6 miles should be fixed and that States 
should have the right, in order to satisfy their vital needs or 
those of their defence, to exercise adnlinistrative rights over 
a .further zone of 6 miles beyond the zone of their sovereignty. 
The limits for islands, archipelagoes, bays and straits were 
fixed on the supposition that the limit of territorial waters 
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was itself extended to 12 miles; if this limit is lowered, it will 
be necessary also to restrict the zones fixed for these special 
cases. (Ibid., p. 191.) 
l)weden, 1926.-The Swedish Government in replying 
to the League of Nations questionnaire in 1926 pointed 
out that Sweden had for more than 100 years nlain-
tained a 4-mile claim to jurisdiction off the coast and that 
12-mile limit for bays would be essential for Sweden. 
As to islands and straits, the Government said : 
Article 5.-Islanas. 
One observation is necessary with regard to the wording of 
this article. If the centre of an archipelago is regarded as the 
point for determining the isles from which the calculation of 
territorial waters is to commence, the provision regarding archi-
pelagos would seem to apply only to those which are situated 
in the open sea; it could not, for instance, apply to groups 
which, like the Swedish coastal archipe1agos (skargard), fringe 
the shoreline. To make Article 5 applicable to the conditions 
of Swedish geography, it would therefore be necessary to add 
a provision to the e:f!fect that when an archipelago fringes tp.e 
coast, the extent of the territorial waters shall be calculated as 
commencing from the islands and reefs furthest from the coast. 
Article 6.-Straits. 
The drafting of Article 6 also calls for an observation on 
the part of the Swedish Government. In certain respects this 
article is not quite clear, as, for instance, the provision which 
lays down " the regime of straits at present subject to special 
conventions." Does this provision mean that if two States whose 
coast line borders certain straits conclude an agreement dividing 
the whole of the straits between thein, this agreement can be 
invoked against third parties, even when, under the convention 
now proposed, the straits also include international waters? 
According to the Rapporteur's original draft, ·which fixed the 
extent of the territorial waters at 6 nautical miles in general, 
straits not exceeding 12 miles in width were to belong entirely 
to the riparian States. The extent of territorial ·waters having 
been reduced to 3 nautical miles in the Rapporteur's second 
draft, the logical consequence would have been to regard as 
entirely territorial waters only those straits which are less than 
6 nautical miles in breadth, or-when both shores of the straits 
belong to the same State-those which are not more than 6 
nautical miles wide at their opening towards the sea. The ~raft, 
however, fixes at 10 miles the maximum width of straits which 
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are to form part of the territorial sea of the coastal States. 
The meaning of the formula "straits not exceeding 10 miles 
in width" is also somewhat uncertain, for there is nothing 
to show whether this formula only applies to straits which do 
not exceed 10 miles in width at any point or whether it refers 
to those parts of straights where the width is 10 miles or less, 
whereas in other parts their width is more than 10 miles. 
l\1oreover, as regards the Swedish standpoint in this matter, 
the Swedish Government would point out that, since the Treaty 
of Roskilde in 1658, one-half of the Sund has been regarded 
as a Swedish territorial sea. Similarly the Straits of Kalmar, of 
which both sides belong to Sweden, are regarded as entirely 
Swedish territorial 'vaters. At their opening towards the sea 
these two straits are both slightly over 10 nautical miles in 
width. (League of Nations Documents, C. 196, M. 70, 1927, V. 
[C. P. D. I. 95 (2)], p. 232.) 
f..T orwegian opinion, 19~7.-. In reply to the question-
naire preparatory to the meeting o:£ the Committee on 
the Codification o:£ International Law, the Norwegian 
Government in a letter o:£ March 3, 1927, said: 
Article 2.-Extent of the Rights of the Riparian State.- * * * 
As regards the tracing of the boundaries, it should be ob-
serYed that the series of fjords and archipelagos ( skargard) 
which are so characteristic a feature of the peculiar Norwegian 
coast line, with its numerous fjords penetrating right into the 
heart of the country and 'vith its countless islands, large and 
small, islets and rocks scattered in a wide band along practi-
cally the whole of the coast, has made it quite impossible for 
Norway to trace a boundary for her territorial waters corre-
sponding to all the sinuosities of her coast line and skargard. 
The boundary has therefore been drawn at a distance of 1 geo-
graphical league from the extreme edge of the coast at low 
tide or from straight lines drawn between. the last outlying 
islets or rocks not constantly covered by the sea, while, out-
side the bays and fjords (which from the most ancient times have 
been regarded and claimed in extenso as internal Norwegian 
waters), the limit has been measured from a line drawn between 
the two farthermost sea ward ends of the coast (mainland, isle 
or islet). 
The Norwegian Government considers that, in these circum-
stances, it would be desirable-and, if ·Norway is to adhere to 
the proposed Convention, necessary-so to draft the present 
article that, as regards the extent and delimitation of the zone 
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of sovereignty itself, it should, like Article 4, which relates to 
bays, take into · proper account a peculiar de facto situation 
which has been ,consecrated by continuous and century-old usage. 
In the opinion of the Norwegian Govern1nent, it would be 
neither natural nor reasonable to fix an identical limit of terri-
torial \Vaters for all coasts without taking into account the 
various characteristics of the latter and \Vithout making due 
allowance for the varying importance, from the point of view 
of national economy and the very existence of the inhabitants, 
of the question of 1naintaining for the coastal population an 
exclusive right to exploit the economic wealth of the territorial 
sea. It would not even seem necessary to fix a standard bound-
ary and we do not see how it would be possible to obtain such 
a result on the lines laid down in the draft Convention. * * * 
Article 5.-Islands.-As stated above, the boundary of Nor-
wegian territorial waters is, according to Norwegian law, traced 
at a distance of 1 geographical league from the jslands, islets 
or rocks farthest seaward which are not constantly covered by 
the sea. The general provision at present in force on this sub-
ject, contained in a Chancellery Memorandum of February 25, 
1812, does not stipulate any limit as regards the distance between 
these islands, islets and rocks and the mainland; it thus pro-
vides for a terri to rial sea extending in one continuous band along 
the coast to a distance of 1 geographical league from the islands, 
islets or rocks farthest seaward without taking account of the 
distance which separates the latter from the continental coast 
line. 
In conformity with the observations it has felt bound to offer 
in connection with Article 2 of the Draft, the Norwegian GoY-
ernnlent feels that it would be desirable to draft the passages 
of Article 5, which concern the delimitation of territorial waters 
around islands, in such a way as to bring them reasonably into 
line with Norwegian law on this subject, which owes its origin 
to the peculiar geographical conditions of the country and has 
been consecrated by continuous and century-old usage. (League 
of Nations, Report to the Council, C. 196, l\1. 70, 1927, V 
[C. P. D. I. 95 (2) ], p. 173.) 
0 ontrol of straits.-The most recent discussion of the 
control of \Vaters of straits is that carried on by the Har-
vard Law School Research in International Law \vhich 
acted through a co1nmittee made up of nien fan1iliar \vith 
international la\v and from all parts of the United 
States. After \vide research and discussion, the report 
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made in 1929 upon the article relating to straits was 
with some omissions and some additions as follows: 
ARTICLE 10 
A strait connecting high seas shall remain open to navigation 
by the private and public vessels of all states, including vessels of 
war. 
0 omment.-This article states the existing rule of in-
ternational law which requires that straits connecting 
high seas shall be open to navigation. This rule applies 
even though the land on both sides is a part of the terri-
tory of a single state; it applies to all straits. 
The Straits to which negotiations have n1ost often re-
lated are the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, the Danish 
Sounds and Belts, and the Straits of Magellan. 
b. Bosphorus and Dardanelles.-The Bosphorus is 
about 18 miles long and from Y2 to 1% miles wide. The 
Dardanelles is about 40 miles long and from 11!2 to 4 
miles 'vide. 
In the Near East the struggle for dominance has made 
the Straits question one of the major matters of Euro-
pean policy. Turkey long in possession of the area bor-
dering upon the Black Sea assumed full authority over 
the 'vaters at its entrance. From the end of the eight-
eenth century navigation of the Black Sea and the 
Straits became a matter of international negotiation. 
The treaty of Belgrade, September 18, 1739, between 
Russia and Turkey provides in article 3 " Que la Russie 
ne pourra, ni sur la mer de Zabache ( Si vache), ni sur la 
mer Noire, construire et a voir de flotte et d'autres na-
vires" (I Noradounghian, Recueil d'Actes /nte:rnatio-
naum de l'E1npire Ottonurn, p. 260), and in article 9 "Et 
reciproquement il sera permis a tons les. marchands sujets 
de l'Empereur des Russies, d'exercer aussi librement le 
commerce dans les etats de la Porte Ottomane. Mais, 
pour ce qui regarde le commerce des R usses sur la mer 
Noire, il sera fait sur les batin1ents appartenants aux 
Turcs." (Ibid., p. 262.) 
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By the treaty o:f July 13, 1'841, in article 1 it was 
stated: "Sa Hautesse le sultan declare qu'il a la :ferme 
resolution de maintenir a l'avenir le principe invariable-
ment etabli comme ancienne regie de son empire, et en 
vertu duquel il a ete de tout temps de:fendu aux bati-
ments de guerre des puissances etrangeres d'entrer dans 
les detroits de Dardanelles et du Bosphore et que tant 
que la Porte se trouve en paix, Sa Hautesse n'admettra 
aucun batimel"l:t de guerre etranger dans les dits detroits," 
"et leurs Majestes * * * de l'autre part, s'engagent 
a respecter cette determination du Sultan, et a se con-
former au principe ci-dessus enonce." (Martens, N. R. 
G. 1841, II, p. 128.) Thus the position o:f Turkey in 
control o:f the Straits seemed to be confirmed and was 
reaffirmed by the treaty o:f 1856. Many volumes have 
been written upon various aspects o:f the questions o:f 
closing the Black Sea and the Straits. 
The United States not being a party to these treaties 
did not recognize the control o:f the Bosphorus and 
Dardanelles as a right though it was impossible to deny 
the usage. 
The World War introduced new problems which are 
not yet settled. Article 178 o:f the treaty o:f Sevres, Au-
gust 10, 1920, proposed to guarantee the :freedom o:f the 
Straits. Upon general principles o:f law apart :from all 
considerations o:f politics, there seems no reason :for 
maintaining that the Black Sea is a closed sea and that 
the Straits are under the control o:f Turkey any more 
than there might be :for contending that the Baltic Sea 
is a closed sea and that the sounds may be closed. 
Danish Sounds.-The claim that the Baltic Sea should 
be a closed sea has been made :for varying reasons. 
Under article 5 o:f the treaty between the United 
States and Denmark o:f 1826 it 'vas agreed that " N ei-
ther the vessels o:f the United States nor their cargoes 
shall, when they pass the Sound o:f the Belts, pay higher 
or other duties than those which are or may be paid 
by the most :favored nation." (8 U. S. Stat. 340.) This 
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treaty was to re1nain in effect for 10 years and for " one 
year after either of the contracting parties shall have 
given notice to the other of its intention to terminate 
the same.5 ~ 
The United States in 1855 gave notice of the termi-
nation of the treaty of 1826 and a new treaty was nego-
tiated in 1857 by 'vhich, in article 1, entire freedom of 
navigation was declared for American vessels in the 
Sound and Belts. (11 Stat. 719.) The United States 
in consideration of the Danish engagement to keep up 
lights and buoys and to Inake " additions and improve-
ments in regard to the lights, buoys and pilot establish-
ments " as might be required, agreed to pay to Den-
mark $393,011. Certain European powers similarly 
accepted their respective quotas by a conventional 
agreement. The Sound dues were no longer collected 
and the navigation between the North Sea and the Baltic 
became free. 
Under the public law of nations it can not be pretended that 
Denmark has any right to levy duties on vessels passing through 
the sound from the North Sea to the Baltic. Under that law 
the navigation of the two seas connected by this strait is free 
to all nations; and therefore the navigation of the channel by 
which they are connected ought also to be free. In the lan-
guage employed by Mr. vVharton " even if such strait be bounded 
on both sides by the territory of the same sovereign and is at the 
same time so narrow as to be commanded by cannon-shot from 
both shores, the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of that sover-
eign over such strait is controlled by the right of other nations 
to communtcate with the seas thus connected." (House Ex. Doc. 
108, 33 Cong., 1 sess., 1848, pp. 38-39.) 
Straits of lJf agellan.-The Straits of Magellan, about 
300 miles long and from 272 to 11 miles wide form a 
convenient passage between the great oceans which wash 
the coasts of the South American continent. At the 
eastern entrance the Argentine Republic and Chile have 
territory upon opposite shores though the most of the 
Straits is wholly between Chilean shores. 
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The treaty of 1848 bet,veen these states gave rise to 
many difficulties. At length by the treaty of July 23, 
1881, bet,veen the Argentine Republic and Chile, it was 
agreed, "Article 5. Le Detroit de Magellan demeure 
neutralise a perpetuite et sa libre navigation est assuree 
aux pavilions de toutes les nations. Afin d'assurer le re-
spect de cette liberte et de cette neutralite il ne sera con-
struit sur ses cotes, ni fortifications, ni ouvrages de de-
fense militaire qui puissent contrarier ce but." (Martens, 
N. R. G. XII, 2e Ser. 491; 72 Brit. and For. State 
Papers, p. 1103.) 
The World War conditions gave rise to questions as to 
the nature of the neutrality under the treaties. As the 
greater part of -the Straits of Magellan is under the 
jurisdiction of Chile, that state early made known its 
attitude. A decree of December 15, 1914, stated, " In 
reference to the· neutrality established in the decree 
No. 1857 of November 5 last of the ministry of foreign 
affairs, the interior waters of the Straits of Magellan 
and the canals of the southern region, even in parts 
'vhich are distant more than 3 miles from either bank, 
should be considered as forming part of the jurisdictional 
or neutral sea." (1916 Naval War College, International 
Law Topics, p. 21.) 
In the case of the Bangor coming before the British 
Prize Court in 1916, it was said : 
The limits of territorial waters, in relation to national and 
international rights and privileges, have of recent years been 
subject to much discussion. It may well be that the old marine 
league, which for long determined the boundaries of territorial 
waters, ought to be extended by reason of the enlarged range 
of guns used for shore protection. 
This case does not, in my view, call for any pronouncement 
upon that question. I am content to decide the question of 
law raised by the claimants upon the assumption that the cap-
ture took place within the territorial waters of the Republic 
of Chile. This assumption, of course, does not ilnply any expres-
sion of opinion as to the character of the Strait of l\iagellan 
as between Chile and other nations. This strait connects the 
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two Yast free oceans of the Atlantic and Pacific. As such, 
the strait must be considered free for the commerce of all 
nations passing between the two oceans. 
In 1879 the GoYernment of the United States of An1erica 
declared that it would not tolerate exclusive claims by any na-
tion whatsoeYer to the Strait of l\Iagellan, and would hold re-
sponsible any GoYernment that undertook, no matter on what 
pretext, to lay any impost on its commerce through the strait. 
Later, in 1881, the Republic of Chile entered into a ti'eaty with 
the Argentine Republic by which the strait was declared to be 
neutralized forever, and free navigation was guaranteed to the 
flags of all nations. 
I haYe refen·ed to these matters in order to show that there 
is a right of free passage through the strait for commercial pur-
poses. It is not inconsistent with this that, during war between 
any nations entitled to use it for commerce, the strait should be 
regarded in whole or in part as the territorial waters of Chile, 
\vhose lands bound it on both sides. 
Upon the assumption made for the purposes of this ease that 
the Bangor was in fact captured within the territorial waters of 
a neutral, the question is whether the Yessel was immune fron1 
legal capture and its consequences according to the law of na-
tions. In other words, can the owners of the vessel, who cue, 
ex hypothesi, to be treated as enemies, rely upon the territorial 
rights of a neutral State and object to the capture? Or must the 
objection to the validity of the capture come from the neutral 
State alone? 
No proposition in international law is clearer, or more sarely 
established, than that a capture within the territorial waters of 
a neutral is, as between enemy belligerents for all purposes right-
ful; and that it is only by the neutral State concerned that the 
legal validity of the capture can be questioned. ( [1916], Probate, 
p. 181.) 
St1?aits connecting open seas.-Extreme claims as to · 
straits had been made at various times as the English 
claims to Bristol and St. George's Channels. As in the 
case of the Danish Sounds, these have gradually dj_sap-
peared. The United States properly contended that any 
freedom of the seas or freedom of navigation would be 
largely a fiction if passage between the different seas 
might be closed at the will of the shore states or if a tax 
were levied for simple passage. 
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It is a source of much satisfaction to Her Majesty's Govern1nent 
that the initiative in bringing this question to a final settlement 
should have been taken by the Danish Government, for altho the 
right to levy dues upon foreign vessels passing through the Sound 
has been recognized by the different powers of Europe, and ha<l 
beco1ne a part of the international law of Europe, yet it has long 
been apparent that a tax which is oppressive to comn1err'e. for 
which no benefit is offered in return to foreign shipping * * * 
could not be permanently Inaintained. ( 46 Brit. and For. State 
Papers, 1855-1856, p. 661.) 
The resolutions adopted by the Institut de Droit In-
ternational, at its session in 1892 provide: 
Article 10. Les dispositions des articles precedents s'appliquent 
aux detroits dont l'ecart n'exede pas douze milles, sauf les modi-
fications et distinctions suivantes: 
1. Les detroits dont les cotes appartiennetnt a des Etats dif-
ferents font partie de la mer territoriale des Etats riverains, qui 
y exerceront leur souverainete jusqu'a la ligne mediane. 
2. Les detroits dont les cotes appartiennent au meme Etat et 
qui sont indispensables aux communications maritimes entre 
deux ou plusieurs Etats autres que l'Etat riverain font toujours 
partie de la mer territoriale du riverain, quel que soit le reap-
proachement des cotes. 
3. Les detroits qui servent de passage d'une mer libre a une 
autre mer libre ne peuvent jamais etre fermes. 
Article 11. Le regime des detroits actuellement soumis a des 
conventions ou usages speciaux demeure reserve. (13 Annuaire, 
p. 330.) 
Treaties and conventions.-The status o:f straits has 
o:ften been a subject o:f treaty regulation. An early ex-
anlple is the treaty between Great Britain and Russia, 
1825: 
Article III. C01nmencing from the Southernmost Point of the 
Island called Prince of Wales Island, which Point lies in the par-
allel of 54 degrees 40 minutes North latitude and between the 
131st and the 133rc1 degree of \Vest longitude ( l\1eridian of Green-
'vich), the said line shall ascend to the North along the channel 
called Portland Channel as far as the Point of the Continent 
'vhere it strikes the 56th degree of North Latitude. (Convention 
between Great Britain and Russia, St. Petersburg, Feb. 1/16, 
1825. 12 Brit. & For. State Papers, p. 38.) 
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS 59 
In commenting on this article, Professor J. Guillermo 
Guerra in his study, " Les Eaux Terri tori ales dans les 
Detroits," published in Revue Generale de Droit Inter-
national Public, Vol. 31, pp. 232-254, vvrites as :follows : 
Ce traite fut ensuite applique dans les rapports cle la Grande-
Bretagne et des Etats-Unis, qui avaient succede aux droits de la 
Russie sur le territoire de !'Alaska. S'il n'a pas indique en 
termes expres la ligne qui devait etre suivie dans la demarcation 
des souverainetes sur le canal de Portland, d'une etendue de 60 
1nilles, les deux gouvernements l'ont du moins interprete en ce 
sens que c'est la ligne mediane qu'il fault prendre en consideration. 
By Article III o:f the treaty o:f Nanking, 1842, between 
Great Britain and China (Treaties between China and 
Foreign States, published by order o:f Inspector General 
o:f Customs, p. 351) it was provided that China should 
cede Hong l(ong to Great Britain. In comn1enting upon 
Article III o:f this treaty Professor Guerra says: 
En 1842 par le traite de Nankin (Art 3), la Grande-Bretagne 
acquit la souverainete sur la petite ne de Hongkong, situee a 
!'entree de l'estuaire de Canton. Cette petite ile est separee du 
continent chinois par la passe de Laimun dont la largeur est si 
reduite qu'elle n'atteint pas un mille. Dans le traite de cession, 
rien ne fut stipule au sujet de la juridiction anglaise ou de la 
juridiction chinoise sur les eaux du petit detroit qui separait 
ainsi les deux souverainetes. l\Iair, d'apres le temoignage de 
Sir Travers Twiss, d'Oppenheim et d'autres auteurs encore, les 
deux puissances ont en fait exerce leur juridiction separement 
jusqu'au fil moyen des eaux. 
The treaty o:f June 15, 1846, Great Britain and the 
United States provides: 
Article I. From the point on the forty-ninth parallel of north 
latitude, where the boundary laid down in existing treaties and 
conventions between the United States and Great Britain termi-
nates, the line of boundary between the territories of the United 
States and those of her Britannic Majesty shall be continued 
westward along the said forty-ninth parallel of north latitude to 
the middle of the channel wh:ch separates the continent from 
Vancouver's Island, and thence southerly through the middle of 
the said channel, and of Fuca's Straits, to the Pacific Ocean:-
Provided, however, That the navigation of the whole of the said 
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channel and straits, south of the forty-ninth parallel of uorth 
latitude, shall remain free and open to both parties. (9 U. S. 
Stat. 869.) 
In con11nenting on the above article, Hall, Interna-
tional La 'v, Eighth Edition, edited by Pearce Higgins, 
writes as foil o'vs : 
By the treaty of Washington of 1846 it was stipulated that 
the boundary between the United States and British North 
America should follow the forty-ninth parallel of latitude to the 
middle of the strait separating Vancouver's Island fr01n the 
continent and from there should run down the middle of the 
Strait of Fuca to the Pacific. Disputes involving the title to 
various islands having arisen, the boundary question at issue 
between the two nations was submitted to the arbitration of 
the German Emperor and in 1873 a protocol was signed at 
Washington for the purpose of marking out the frontier in ac-
cordance with his arbitral decision. Under this protocol, the 
boundary after passing the islands which had given rise to the 
dispute is carried across a space of water 35 miles long by 20 
miles broad, and is then continued for 50 miles down the middle 
of a strait 15 miles broad until it touches the Pacific Ocean mid-
way between Bonilla Point on Vancouver's Island and Tatooch 
Island lighthouse on the A1nerican shore, the waterway being 
there 10¥2 miles in width (p. 195). 
The treaty of Copenhagen, Jfarch 14, 1857.-" Treaty 
between Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France, Han-
over, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Oldenburg, Netherlands, 
Prussia, Russia, Sweden and Norway, and the Hanse 
Towns, on the one part, and Denmark, on the other 
part, for the Redemption of the Sound Dues." 
Article I. De ne prelever aucun droit de douane, de tonnage, 
de balisage * * * sur les navires qui se rendront de la 
Mer du Nord dans la Baltique, ou v·ice versa, en passant par les 
Belts ou le Sund, soit qu'ils se bornent a traverser les eaux 
danoises * * *. ( 47 Brit. and For. State Papers, 1856--1857, 
p. 24.) 
A declaration to the following effect between Great 
Britain and France was signed at London, April 3, 1904, 
respecting Egypt and Morocco : 
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Article VII. In order to secure the free passage of the Straits 
of Gibraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erec~ 
tion of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion 
of the coast of l\1orocco comprised between, but not including, 
l\Ielilla and the heights which command the right bank of the 
River Sebou. (97 Brit. and For. State Papers, 1903-1904, p. 40.) 
A convention o£ April 11, 1908, betvveen Great Britain 
and the United States relating to the international 
boundary provided: 
The remaining portion of the line, lying between the two 
above-described sections, and upon the location of which the 
said former Commissioners did not agree, shall pass through 
the center of the Lubec Narrows Channel between Campo Bello 
Island and the mainland. (35 U. S. Stat. 2003.) 
A further treaty, May 21, 1910, between Great Brit-
ain and the United States concerning the boundary line 
in Passamaquoddy Bay provided: 
Now, Therefore, upon the evidence and arguments so pre~ 
sented, and after taking into consideration all actions of the 
respective Governments and of their representatives authorized 
in that behalf and of the local governments on either side of 
the line, whether prior or subsequent to such treaties and award, 
tending to aid in the interpretation thereof, the High Contracting 
Parties hereby agree that the location of the international bound-
ary line between the United States and the Dominion · of Canada 
from a point in Passamaquoddy Bay accurately defined in the 
Treaty between the United States and Great Britain of April 11, 
1908, as lying between Treat Island and Friar Head, and extend-
ing thence through Passamaquoddy Bay and to the middle of 
Grand lYianan Channel, shall run in a series of seven connected 
straight lines for the distances and in the directions as follows. 
(36 U. S. Stat. 2477.) 
The Bosphorus and Dardanelles, 19B0-19B3.-The Bos-
phorus and Dardanelles have £rom early times been the 
scene o£ controversies. Regulation of the use o£ the 
Straits has been the subject o£ many diplomatic discus-
sions. For a long time the use o£ the Straits was gov-
erned by the treaties o£ 1856 and 1871 by which vessels 
o£ war were in general excluded. 
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The post,var negotiations resulted in the unratified 
treaty of Sevres, August 10, 1920, in 'vhich among the 
articles relating to the Straits 'vere the follo,ving: 
Article 37. The navigation of the Straits, including the Darda-
nelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bospllorus, shall in future 
be open, both in peace and war, to every vessel of commerce or 
of war and to military and commercial aircraft, without distinc-
tion of flag. 
These waters shall not be subject to blockade, nor shall any 
belligerent right be exercised nor any act of hostility be com-
mitted within them, unless in pursuance of a decision of the 
Council of the League of Nations. 
Artkle 38. The Turkish Government recognizes that it is nec-
essary to take further measures to ensure the freedom of na vi-
gation provided for in Article 37, and accordingly delegates, so 
far as it is concerned, to a COinmission to be called the Com-
mission of the Straits, and hereinafter referred to as the Commb;;. 
sion, the control of the waters specified in Article 39. 
The Greek Government, so far as it is concerned, delegates to 
the Commission the same powers and undertakes to give it in all 
respects the same facilities. 
Such control shall be exercised in the name of the Turkish and 
Greek Governments respectively, and in the manner provided in 
this Section. 
Article 39. The authority of the Commission will extend to all 
the waters between the Mediterranean mouth of the Dardanelles 
and the Black Sea 1nouth of the Bosphorus, and to the waters 
within 3 miles of each of these mouths. 
This authority may be exercised on shore to such extent as may 
be necessary for the execution of the provisions of this Section. 
The treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, which became 
operative provided: 
Article 23. The high contracting parties are agreed to recognize 
and declare the principle of freed01n of transit and of navigation, 
by sea and by air, in time of peace as in tin1e of \Yar, in the 
strait of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and.the Bosphorus, 
as prescribed in the separate convention signed this day, regarding 
the regime of the Straits. This convention will have the same 
force and effect in so far as the present high contracting parties 
are concerned as if it formed part of the present treaty. (28 L. 
N. T. S., p. 13; see also 18 Amer. Journal International Law, Sup-
plement, 1924, p. 11.) 
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In the convention relating to the regi1ne of the Straits 
also signed July 24, 1923, it was provided in regard to 
(2) ·warships, including fleet auxiliaries, troopships, 
aircraft carriers, and military aircraft: 
(a) * * * 
(b) In time of war, Turkey being neutral. 
Complete freedom of passage by day and by night under any 
flag, without any formalities, or tax. or charge whatever, under 
the same limitations as in paragraph 2 (a). 
However, these limitations will not be applicable to any bel-
ligerent Power to the prejudice of its belligerent rights in the 
Black Sea. 
The rights and duties of Turkey as a neutral Power cannot 
authorize her to take any measures liable to interfere with navi-
gation through the Straits, the waters of which, and the air 
above whirch, must remain entirely free in time of war, Turkey 
being neutral, just as in time of peace. 
'Varships and military aircraft of belligerents will be forbid-
den to make any capture, to exercise the right of visit and search, 
or to carry out any other hostile act in the Straits. 
As regards revictualling and carrying out repairs, war vessels 
will be subject to the terms of the Thirteenth Hague Conven-
tion of 1907, dealing with Inaritime neutrality. 
l\Iilitary aircraft will receive in the Straits similar treatment 
to that accorded under the Thirteenth Hague Convention of 1907 
to warships, pending the conclusion of an international ~onvention 
establishing the rules of neutrality for aircraft. 
(c) In tirne of war, Turkey being belligm··ent. 
Complete freedom of passage for neutral warships, without any 
formalities, or tax, or charge whatever, but under the same limi-
tations as in paragraph 2 (a). 
The measures taken by Turkey to prevent enemy ships and 
aircraft from using the Straits are not to be of such a nature as 
to prevent the free passage of neutral ships and aircraft, and 
Turkey agrees to provide the said ship and aircraft with either 
the necessary instructions or pilots for the above .purpose. 
Neutral n1ilitary aircraft will make the passage of the Straits 
at their own risk and peril, and will submit to investigation as to 
their character. For this purpose aircraft are to alight on the 
ground or on the sea in such areas as are specified and prepared 
for this purpose by Turkey. 
(3) (a) The passage of the Straits by submatines of Powers at 
peace with Turkey must be made on the surface. (28 L. N. T. S., 
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p. 115; see also 18 Amer. Journal International Law, Supple1nent, 
1924, p. 56.) 
The proposed treaty "\vith United States, signed Au-
gust 6, 1923, "\vould have covered many o:f the provisions 
o:f the treaty o:f Lausanne. 
Islands and archipelagoes.-The Harvard La'v School 
Research in International Law also considered mariti1ne 
jurisdiction around islands and in its draft on terri-
torial waters drew up the :follo"ring: 
ARTICLE 7 
The marginal sea around an island, or around land exposed 
only at some stage of the tide, is measured outward 3 miles there-
from in the same manner as from the mainland. 
0 on11nent.-""\V"ith some additions and omissions the 
co1nment on the article :follows : 
The practice is nearly uni:for1n in beginning to measure 
the 1narginal sea :from low "\Vater mark along the coasts 
o:f a mainland. The only difficulty arises in connection 
with rocks, islands, reefs, etc., lying off the coast. I:f an 
island lies not 1nore than 6 miles :from the coast, the 
n1arginal sea should be extended t9 a distance o:f 3 
miles :from the island. Similarly in any situation "\vhere 
islands are within 6 miles o:f the coast or o:f each other, 
1narginal waters "\viii mingle and :form OI~e extended 
zone. No different rule should be established :for groups 
o:f islands or archipelagoes, except that i:f the outer 
:fringe o:f islands are sufficiently close to :for1n one belt, 
any "\vider expanse o:f water "\vithin such belt should be 
considered territorial. I:f all the islands o:f a group 
belong to one state and the separating distance is 6 
and a :fraction miles, thus leaving a narro"\v passage be-
t,veen marginal seas, it would see1n equitable to permit 
an extension, but there can not be said to be any estab-
lished rule on the point. It might be possible to agree 
that "\vhere the intervening passage is less than 1 1nile 
(or less than one-hal:f mile) in "\vidth, the littoral State 
may consider such "\Vaters as part o:f its marginal sea. 
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In the above connection, any rock, coral, mud, sand, 
or other natural solid formation which is exposed above 
the surface of the 'vater at low tide, should be considered 
an " island." If a fringe of exposed rocks is situated 
at a distance of say 10 n1iles fron1 the coast, there seems 
to be no established basis for considering all waters be-
tween the rocks and the mainland as terri to rial waters. 
Special consideration should, however, be . accorded to 
claims established and Ina in tained over a long period 
of time. Such 1nay be the Scandinavian claims and 
those of Australia. 
Att-itude of the United States.-~Ir. Bayard, Secre-
tary of State, in a letter to ~fr. Manning, Secretary o:f 
the Treasury, ~fay 28, 1886, referred to the coastal juris-
diction of the United States: 
'Ve may, therefore, regard it as settled * * * that so far 
as concerns the eastern coast of North America, the position of 
this Department has uniformly been that the sovereignty of 
the shore does not, so far as territorial authority is concerned, 
extend beyond 3 miles fron1 low-water mark, and that the sea-
ward boundary of this zone of territorial waters follows the 
coast of the mainland, extending where there are islands so 
as to place round such islands the same belt. This necessarily 
excludes the position that the seaward boundary is to be dra,vn 
from headland to headland, and n1akes it follow closely, at a 
distance of 3 miles, the boundary of the shore of the continent 
or of adjacent islands belonging to the continental sovereign. 
(I 'Vharton, Digest of International Law, p. 107.) 
Spitsbe1·gen.-Special provision was 1nade in regard to 
Spitsbergen by treaty on February 9, 1920. 
In article 1 of this treaty, the powers recognized "the 
full and absolute sovereignty of Norway over the Archi-
pelago of Spitsbergen," etc., "between 10° and 35° longi-
tude East of. Greenwich and between 7 4 ° and 81° lati-
tude North." In article 2 it is provided that-
ships and nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall 
enjoy equally the rights of fishing and hunting in the territories 
spe<;ified in Article 1 and in their territorial waters. 
Norway shall be free to maintain, take or de<;ree suitable meas-
ures to insure the preservation and, if necessary, the re-constitu-
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tion of the fauna and flora of the said regions, and their terri-
torial waters. ( 43 U. S. Stat. 1892.) 
Legislation and decrees.-There has been from time 
to time legislation in regard to lands along the coast. 
A French law of 1912 provides: 
Article 2. Pour !'application des regles de la convention XIII 
de la Haye en date du 18 octobre 1907: 
"Les eaux territoriales fran{;aises s'etendent en de{;a d'une 
limite qui est fixee a 10 milles marins au large de la laisse de la 
basse mer le long de toutes les cotes et des banes decouvrants qui 
en dependent, ainsi que autour du balisage fixe qui determine la 
limite des banes non decouvrants." (Journal officiel de la Re-
publique Fran~aise, 1912, Sept.-Oct., p. 8976.) 
Russia in pre-war days foresaw certain exceptional 
conditions on its icy coast. 
1. \Vhere the extent of the seashore radius is not defined by 
special international enactments or treaties, the present rules 
cover the coastal sea to a distance of 3 geographical miles 
(equals 12.02 marine miles equals 20.87 versts), counting from 
the line of lowest ebb-tide or from the extremity of the coastal 
standing ice. (Russian law No. 10H6 of May 29, 1911; 1912 U. S. 
For. Rel., p. 1303.) 
Uruguay in providing for neutrality proclaimed: 
In accordance with the principle established by the treaty of 
Montevideo in 1889 (Penal Law, Article 12), and with the princi-
ples generally accepted in these matters, the waters will be con-
sidered as territorial waters, to a distance of 5 miles from the 
coast of the rna inland and islands, from the visible outlying 
shoals, and the fixed marks which determine the · limit of the 
banks not visible." (Neutrality Proclamation of August 7, 1914, 
art. 2; 1916 Naval War College, International Law Documents, 
pp. 106-107.) 
Differences of opinion.-Even on the matter of the 
measurement of territorial sea along the coast there re-
mains difference of opinions. In regard to other mari-
time areas there is even wider variation of opinion. For 
the Conference for the Codification of International 
Law certain bases of discussion were dra 'vn up by the 
preparatory co1nmittee in 1929. One of these was Basis 
of Discussion No. 3 : 
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The breadth of the territorial waters under the sovereignty of 
the coastal State is 3 na1,1tical miles. 
The conference met at The Hague in 1930 and after 
discussion, a provisional expression o:f opinion as to the 
extent o:f territorial sea was proposed and, with the dis-
tinct understanding that the expression o:f opinion should 
not be regarded as final, the :following statements were 
1nade: 
1\Ir. Lansdown (Union of South Africa) .-I beg to express my 
view in favour of Basis No. 3 as printed, that the breadth of ter-
ritorial waters should be 3 nautical miles. 
l\I. Schiicking (Germany) .-The German Delegation is in fa-
vour of the 3-Inile rule, together with the existence of an adjacent 
zone, in the hope that the acceptance of the principle of the 
adjacent zone may facilitate the acceptance of the 3-mile rule by 
other countries. 
l\Ir. l\Iiller (U. S. A.) .-I read one sentence which is contained 
in various existing treaties of the United States: 
"The High Contracting Parties declare that it is their firm 
intention to uphold the principle that 3 marine miles extending 
from the coast line outwards and measured from low water mark 
constitute the proper limits of territorial waters." 
l\I. de Ruelle (Belgium) .-We accept the 3-mile rule, together 
with a zone of adjacent waters. 
Sir l\Iaurice Gwyer (Great Britain) .-The British Delegation 
firmly support Basis No. 3-that is to say, a territorial belt 
of 3 Iniles without the exercise, as of right, of any powers by 
the Coastal State in the contiguous zone, and they do that on 
three grounds, 'vhich I will express in as few words as I can: 
First, because in their view the 3-mile limit is a rule of inter-
national law already existing adopted by maritime nations which 
possess nearly 80 per cent of the effective tonnage of the world; 
secondly, because we have already, in this Committee, adopted 
the principle of sovereignty over territorial waters; and thirdly, 
because the 3-mile limit is the limit which is most in favour of 
freedom of navigation. 
I ought to add that in this matter I speak also on behalf of 
His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia. 
l\Ir. Pearson (Canada) .-The Government of Canada is in fa-
vour of the 3-mile territorial limit for all nations and for all 
purposes~ 
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M. ~Iarchant (Chile) .-The Chilean Delegation will accept 6 
miles as the breadth of territorial waters without an adjacent 
zone, or 3 miles with an adjacent zone. 
l\1. ,V. Hsieh (China) .-The Chinese Delegation accepts the 
Basis of Discussion No. 3 in principle. 
M. Arango (Colombia).-! am in favour of the 6-mile limit. 
M. de Arinenteros (Cuba) .-The Cuban Delegation is against 
Basis No. 3. I pronounce myself in favour of 6 miles with an 
adjacent zone. 
l\1. Lorek (Denmark) .-,Ve are in principle in favour of Basis 
of Discussion No. 3, but as the rules concerning bays are very 
unsettled and the question of bays is of great importance to Den-
mark, it is impossible for me to give a definite decision at the 
n1oment. 
Abel Hamid Badaoui Pacha (Egypt) .-We are in favour of 3 
miles territorial 'vater, together with an adjacent zone. 
M. Angulo (Spain) .-In accordance with their amendment, the 
Spanish Delegation is in favour of 6 miles territorial 'vater, 
together with an adjacent zone. 
l\1. Varn1a (Estonia) .-The Estonian Delegation wishes for the 
3 miles territorial water, and an adjacent zone. 
l\1. Erich (Finland) .-For reasons of solidarity with its neigh-
bours the Scandinavian States, the Finnish Delegation favours 
a zone of 4 miles for territorial waters, provided an adjacent 
zone of sufficient width is granted to her at the same time. In 
the latter case the Finnish Delegation could also accept a 3-mile 
zone, but primarily she favours a 4-Inile zone. If, contrary to 
expectations, the majority of the Commission did not pronounce 
in favour of an adjacent zone, the Finnish Delegation reserves 
the right to con1e back to this question and to take a different 
attitude regarding the depth of territorial 'vaters. 
M. Gidel (France) .-France has no objection to the acceptance 
of the 3-mile rule, provided that there is a belt of adjacent 
waters, and subject· to the rules which may be agreed to in 
regard to the method of determining the datum line of the 
territorial belt. 
l\1. Giannini (Italy) .-May I ask my French colleague the 
meaning of the reservation he has 1nade. 
l\1. Gidel (France).-! will explain n1yself more fully on a 
subsequent occasion as I would not wish to prolong this proc-
ess of voting. I thought however that I had made my mean-
ing sufficiently clear; we desire an adjacent zone and we accept 
the 3-mile limit provided that a solution satisfactory to us is 
arrived at with regard to the datum line of the territorial belt. 
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:u. Spiropoulos (Greece) .-The Greek Delegation has already 
stated that they accept the 3-mile rule. They would even be 
prepared to accept 2 miles in the interests of the freedom of 
navigation if all States w~re prepared to accept it. As we 
have already accepted the 3-mile limit and the principle of 
sovereignty, the Greek Delegation considers that no adjacent 
zone is necessary. However, as there are some countries which 
desire a greater extent than 3 miles of territorial waters, they 
would even be prepared to accept an adjacent zone, particu-
larly as Greece, according to the legislation at present in force, 
already possesses one. 
Sir Ewart Greaves (India) .-The Government of India ac-
cepts Basis No. 3. 
::\lr. Charles Green (Irish Free State) .-The Gover1unent of 
the Irish Free State accepts Basis No. 3 as printed, but recog-
nises that, in certain countries and for certain purposes, there 
are require1nents of the nature set out in Basis No. 5. 
:\1. Bjornssen (Iceland) .-The Icelandic Delegation accepts 
4 miles. 
:\I. Giannini (Italy) .-Six miles. 
:l\1. :\Iushakoji (Japan) .-The Japanese Delegation accepts the 
3-mile limit without an adjacent zone. 
1\I. Albat (Latvia) .-The Latvian Delegation accepts 6 miles 
with an adjacent zone. 
:\1. Raestad (Norway) .-As there is no binding rule of in-
ternational law on this question, the Norwegian Government 
considers that it is necessary to take into consideration the re-
quirements of the different countries. The Delegation pro .. 
nounces in favour of the limit of 4 miles; that rule is older than 
the 3-mile rule. 
\Vith regard to other countries, the Norweigian Government 
would be prepared to recognize a greater width of territorial 
waters provided, as is stated in the Norwegian Government's 
printed reply,. that the demand was based on continuous and 
ancient usage. 
\Vith regard to adjacent waters, they must be limited by 
the needs regarding customs and security. 
Admiral Surie (Netherlands) .-The Netherlands Delegation 
cannot give an opinion on the question of adjacent waters until 
it is informed what rights will be involved. It is, however, 
prepared to accept Basis No. 3 as regards the breadth of the 
territorial waters, which it accepts at three miles. 
It bases its decision, first on the necessity of safeguarding 
the interest of commercial navigation on the high seas, and 
secondly, on the consideration of not placing any too heavy 
obligations on the Coastal State. 
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M. Sepahbodi (Persia) .-The Persian Delegation accepts the 
6-mile rule with an adjacent zone. 
M. Makowski (Poland) .-The Polish Delegation is in favour of 
a 3-mile breadth of territorial waters together 'vith an adjacent 
zone sufficiently wide to enable the Coastal State to protect its 
legitimate interests. 
M. de Magalhaes (Portugal) .-The Portuguese Delegation has 
already said that it desires a territorial belt of 12 miles in width, 
but it is prepared to accept a belt of 6 miles provided there is an 
adjacent zone also of 6 miles in width. 
The reason for the claim of a territorial belt of 6 miles is, 
firstly, because of the special position of Portugal on the conti-
nental plateau and its possession of fisheries 'vhich are vital to 
its interests, and secondly, for a general reason; that is to say~ 
that the 3-mile limit is inadequate, as is proved by the claims for 
adjacent waters which have been put forward by many other 
countries, some of them demanding a great width for the adja-
cent zone. 
They therefore accept the 6-mile belt together with adjacent 
'vaters, and in those adjacent waters they demand to be accorded 
police rights over fisheries such as have been recommended in all 
recent fishery congresses. 
M. Meitani (Roumania) .-The Roumanian Delegation accepts 
a territorial belt of 6 miles and reserves its attitude on the ques-
tion of adjacent waters. 
M. Sjoborg (Sweden) .-The Swedish Delegation desires a ter-
ritorial belt of 4 miles in width, but recognises as legitimate the 
other historic belts at present in force in a certain number of 
countries, that is, for example, 3 and 6 mile zones. 
M. Sitensky (Czechoslovakia) .-The Czechoslovak Delegation 
desires the greatest possible freedom of navigation, but not having 
any coast line they consider that they should abstain from pro-
posing a definite extent for the zone of territorial waters. 
Chinasi Bey (Turkey) .-The Turkish Delegation desires a 6-
mile belt of territorial waters with an adjacent zone. 
M. Buero (Uruguay) .-The Uruguayan Delegation desires a 
territorial belt of 6 miles and reserves its attitude on the question 
of adjacent waters. 
M. Novakovitch (Yugoslavia) .-The Yugoslav Delegation de-
sires a territorial belt of 6 miles and reserves its attitude on the 
question of adjacent waters. 
M. de Vianna-I{elsch (Brazil) .-The Brazilian Delegation ac-
cepts a territorial belt of 6 miles for all purposes. 
1\I. Egoriew (U. S. S. R.) .-If one takes into consideration the 
state of positive law at the present time, as it can be discovered 
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in the legislation of the different States through treaties and 
diplomatic correspondence, it is necessary to recognise the great 
diversity of view which exists in the waters called territorial anct 
adjacent. The exercise of such rights for all purposes or for cerM 
tain purposes is admitted sometimes within the limit of 3, someM 
times 4, 6, 10 or 12 miles. 
The reasons, both historical and theoretical, invoked by some 
States and disputed by others, cannot be put into opposition to 
these facts and the rule or actual necessity for States to ensure 
their needs, particularly in waters along the coast which are 
not used for international navigation. This aspect which has 
been already noted in the literature on the subject, as well as 
in debates, in this Commission, cannot be overlooked. (League 
of Nations, C. 230, l\I. 117, 1930, V, Conf. C. D. I. 19 (2), p. 15.) 
\Vhen the differences of opinion upon the fundamental 
question of coastal jurisdiction are diverse, it is evident 
that states may find grounds £or demanding that their 
security be not endangered by too strict interpretation 
o£ the widely accepted rule of the 3-mile limit of mari-
time jurisdiction. 
The "Fagernes."-The case of the Fagernes arose 
from a collision between the British owned steamship 
Cornish Coast and the Italian owned Fagernes on 
~1arch 17, 1926. The collision took place in the Bristol 
Channel at a point " 10 or 12lj2 miles distance from the 
English coast and 9¥2 or 7¥2 miles from the Welsh 
coast," according to the respective cases, the distance 
across the channel being about 20 sea miles. The question 
arose as to whether the collision took place within Brit-
ish jurisdiction. When the case came before the court 
in 1926, it was said of the place of collision, " I£ that 
spot is within the jurisdiction it is immaterial whether 
it is in England or in Wales. It is equally within the 
jurisdiction of the High Court." (1926, Probate Divorce 
and Admiralty, p. 185.) The point at which the colli-
sion occurred was held by Mr. Justice Hill to be within 
British jurisdiction. Later this case came before the 
judges of the Court of Appeal. For this court -the 
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Attorney General \vas asked \vhether the Cro,vn clain1ed 
that the place of collision was " within the reahn of 
England." 
The Attorney General replied that the Secretary of State for 
Home Affairs instructed him to say that " the spot \vhere this 
collision is alleged to have occurred is not within the limits to 
\vhich the territorial sovereignty of His Majesty extends." (1927, 
P., p. 319.) 
In the opinion of Bankes, L. J., is mentioned the ap-
pearance of the Attorney General and it is stated that-
he gave the Court an exhaustive statement of the opinions of 
jurists and text writers from very early times upon this much 
discussed question of the territorial jurisdiction over creeks, 
bays, etc. ; and he referred the Court to all the relevant authori-
ties, with the view of inducing the Court not to lay do,vn any 
rule on the question, but to content themselves merely by saying 
that there was no authority for holding that the place of this 
collision ·was \Vithin the jurisdiction. The question of \vhat is 
within the realm of England being one of the matters of which 
the Court takes judicial notice, we thought it right to ask the 
Attorney General whether the Crown did or did not claim that 
particular part of the Bristol Channel where this collision oc-
curred, as being within the territorial jurisdiction of the I<:ing; 
and he replied that the Cro·wn did not. This information was 
given at the instance of the Court, and for the information of 
the Court. Given under such circumstances, and on such a sub-
ject, it does not in my opinion necessarily bind the Court in the 
sense that it is under an obligation to accept it. 
Having regard, however, to the position created by the infor-
mation given to the Court by the Attorney General, to absence of 
authority and to the general trend of the more recent opinion 
on the ·question of limiting the width of the fauces terrae to \Vhich 
the rule of territorial jurisdiction should apply, I think the 
Court ought to be guided by the infonnation given to the Court 
by the Attorney General, to the extent of saying that they do not 
consider that there is sufficient authority for supporting the judg-
ment of Hill, J., and that the order appealed from must be set 
aside and the decision of the learned judge reversed \Vith costs 
here and below. I confine my judgment to the particular part 
of the Channel where this collision occurred and to a case where 
no evidence of any effective occupation is given. (Ibid., p. 323.) 
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Some members of the court, however, were of the opin-
ion if a decision had been rendered without the statements 
of the Attorney General, it would have followed the 
OP.inion of Hill, J., from which appeal had been taken. 
( Development of aerial rules.-It is not the intention 
as evidenced by aerial rules at present accepted to grant 
to aircraft in time of war the same freedom of move-
ment as that granted nav~l vessels, but rather to restrict 
the freedom of aircraft in neutral jurisdiction to a degree 
more nearly approximating that of military land mate-
rial and personnel. A compromise has been generally 
accepted 'vhich permits military aircraft to enter neutral 
jurisdiction when upon and remaining on board vessels 
of 'var if vessels of war themselves are permitted to 
enter. 
Previous to 1914 and even during the early days of 
the 'V or ld "\V ar there had been proposals to limit bellig-
erent activities to land and sea and to prohibit by inter-
national agreement in 'vhole or in part the use of aerial 
space for warfare. This was to a degree accomplished by 
'fhe Hague Convention of 1899 which for a period of 
five years prohibited the launching of projectiles and ex-
plosives from aircraft. While by strict interpretation 
the ter1ns of this convention ceased to be binding on the 
belligerents during the Russo-Japanese War yet the two 
belligerents mutually observed its provisions till the end 
of the war. Before 1907 it became clear that the devel-
opment of aerial navigation had made old rules obso-
lete. No formal and comprehensive rules existed in 1914 
and the practice of the World War showed the need of 
some regulations. 
Submarines in 1916.-There had been in 1916 numer-
ous rumors in regard to contemplated visits of sub-
marines to American waters. The British Government 
in a note of July 3, 1916, maintained that it was unlikely 
that such a visit would be for any other purpose than 
for conducting hostile operations, and set forth its ideas 
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as to neutral duties. The Government further stated 
that-
The enemy subn1arines have been endeavoring for nearly 18 
months to prey upon the Allied and neutral commerce, and 
throughout that period enemy governments have never claimed 
that their submarines were entitled to obtain supplies from 
neutral ports. This must have been due to the fact that they 
thought they would be met with a refusal and that hospitality 
could not be claimed as of right. The difficulty of knowing 
the movements or controlling the subsequent action of the sub-
marines renders it impossible for the neutral to guard against 
any breaches of neutrality after the submarine has left port and 
justifies the neutral in drawing a distinction between surface 
ships and submarines. The latter, it is thought, should be 
treated on the same footing as seaplanes or other aircraft 
and should not be allowed to enter neutral ports at all. This 
is the rule prescribed during the present war by Norway and 
Sweden. Another point of distinction between surface ships 
and submarines should be borne in mind. A surface vessel de-
manding the hospitality of a neutral port runs certain inevitable 
risks; its whereabouts become known and an enemy cruiser can 
await its departure from port. This and similar facts put a 
check on the above by belligerent surface ships of neutral hos-
pitality. No such disadvantages limit the use to which the 
Germans might put neutral ports as bases of supplies for 
submarine raiders. 
For these reasons, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, 
if any enemy submarine attempts to enter a neutral port, permis· 
sion should be refused by the authorities. If the submarine 
enters it should be interned unless it has been driven into port 
by necessity. In the latter case it should be allowed to depart 
as soon as necessity is at an end. In no circumstances should 
it be allowed to obtain supplies. 
If a submarine should enter a neutral port flying the mercan-
tile flag Hi~ Majesty's Government are of opinion that it 
is the duty of the neutral authorities concerned to enquire closely 
into its right to fly that flag, to inspect the vessel thoroughly 
and, in the event of torpedoes, torpedo tubes or guns being found 
on board, to refuse to recognise it as a merchant ship. 
In bringing the above to your serious consideration I have the 
honor to express the confident hope that the United States Gov-
ernment will feel able to agree in the views of His Majesty's 
Government and to treat submarine vessels of belligerent powers 
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visiting United States ports accordingly. (1916, Foreign Rela-
tions, Supplement, p. 766.) 
'Vhen the submarine Deutschland arrived in Balti-
more on July 9, 1916, with a cargo o£ dyestuffs, it was 
advisedly treated by the United States as a merchant 
vessel. The British Government pointed out the dan-
gers o£ this action. 
British position.-By a telegram o£ the British Sec-
retary o:£ State :£or Foreign Affairs to the British ain-
bassador at Washington, July 18, 1916, the British po-
sition was further set forth in consequence o£ the treat-
ment o:£ the Deutschland. 
Fron1 point of view of sea po\ver so much depends both now 
and in the future upon the way in which submarines are to 
be treated in international law that it see1ns impossible to 
leave the controversy at the stage where the United States 
Government are disposed to let it rest. 
The first point to be established is that international law ought 
not to transfer without modification to submarines, rules and 
regulations which work fairly well as regards surface vessels. 
If this be once conceded we 1nay hope to have an international 
code drawn up which might meet conditions of naval warfare. 
It is argued that German commercial submarine carries cargo 
but no armament and that it should therefore be treated exactly 
like any other ship which carries cargo but not armament. 
On this it must be observed that most formidable part of sub-
marine, namely, its submersibility, is one of its inseparable at-
tributes. Whatever else it carries and for whatever purpose it 
may nominally have been designed, it cannot divest itself of its 
most dangerous characteristic. If a belligerent were to use for 
mercantile purposes a vessel which in every respect was designed 
and armoured as a battle cruiser, but which carried no guns, 
everybody would say: "This is only colourably a merchant ship; 
nine-tenths of work required to convert her into a completely 
equipped ship of war of most formidable type has already been 
put into her and cannot be removed. Clearly it is as ship of war 
that she should be treated." 
So it is with the submarine. It is not torpedoes and torpedo 
tubes which make her what she is. These are weapons which 
may equally be possessed by a trawler. What really puts her in 
a class apart and makes it necessary to treat her under special 
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rules is the indefeasible quality 'vhich she possesses of travelling 
under water. She bears no real resemblance to a liner 'vhich in 
time of 'var may have a few guns put into her and be turned 
into an auxiliary cruiser but can never be made a powerful fight-
ing unit. The submersible cargo boat, for all her peaceful ap-
pearance, possesses and must always possess qualities \vhich 
would enable her at. very short notice to be converted into a 
fighting vessel of most forinidable kind; her case is therefore 
exceptional and calls for exceptional treatment. 
If this be denied it 'vould seem to follow that unarmed sub-
marines might be constructed in any number in neutral countries 
and then be armed by belligerent purchaser with necessary 
torpedo tubes. To take an example, Great Britain 'vould then, 
if Germany and the United States ·were at war, be compelled to 
supply Germany with submarines to be subsequently used in 
destroying Anglo-American trade. (Ibid., p. 769.) 
Allied attitude on submarines, 1916.-Identic memo-
randa were sent to the Department of State of the 
United States by the French, British, Russian, J ap-
anese, Italian, and Portuguese Governments in August, 
1916, as follows : 
In view of the development of submarine navigation, and by 
reason" of the acts 'vhich, in present circumstances, may unfor-
tunately be expected from enemy submarines, the Allied Gov-
ernments consider it necessary, in order not only to safeguard 
their belligerent rights and the liberty of commercial naviga-
tion, but to avoid risks of dispute, to urge neutral governments 
to take effective measures, if they have not already done so, 
with a view to preventing belligerent submarine vessels, what-
ever the purpose to which they are put, from making use of 
neutral waters, roadsteads, and ports. 
In the case of submarine vessels, the application of the prin-
ciples of the la'v of nations is affected by special and novel 
conditions; first, by the fact that these vessels can navigate 
and remain at sea submerged, and can thus escape all control 
and observation; and second, by the fact that it is impossible 
to. identify them and to establish their national character, 
whether neutral or belligerent, combatant or noncombatant, and 
to remove the capacity for harm inherent in the nature of such 
vessels. 
It may further be said that any place which provides a sub· 
marine warship far from its base with opportunity for rest and 
replenishment of its supplies thereby furnishes such an addi-
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tion to its po\vers that the place becomes in fact, through the 
advantages which it gives, a base of naval operations. 
In view of the state of affairs thus existing, the Allied Gov-
ernments are of opinion that-
Submarine vessels should be excluded from the benefit of the 
rules hitherto recognized by the law of nations regarding the 
admission of vessels of war or merchant vessels into neutral 
waters, roadsteads, or ports, and their sojourn in them. 
Any belligerent submarine entering a neutral port should be 
detained there. 
The Allied Governments take this opportunity to point out to 
neutral powers the grave danger incurred by neutral submarines 
in navigating regions frequented by belligerent submarines. 
(1916, Foreign Relations, Supplement, p. 769.) 
Reply of United States.-After reviewing the memo-
-randum of the Allied Powers, the Department of State 
said on August 31, 1916, that-
In the opinion of the Government of the United States the 
Allied powers have not set forth any circumstances, nor is the 
Governtnent of the United States at present aware of any cir-
cutnstances, concerning the use of war or merchant submarines 
which would render the existing rules of international law in-
applicable to then1. In view of this fact and of the notice and 
warning of the Allied powers announced in their memoranda 
under acknowledgment, it is incumbent upon the Government of 
the United States to notify the Governments of France, Great 
Britain, Russia, and Japan that, so far as the treatment of either 
war or merchant submarines in Atnerican waters is concerned, 
the Government of the United States reserves its liberty of action 
in all respects and will treat such vessels as, in its opinion, be-
comes the action of a power which may be said to have taken 
the first steps toward establishing the principles of neutrality and 
which for over a century has maintained those principles in the 
traditional spirit and with the high sense of impartiality in 
which they were conceived. 
In order, however, that there should be no misunderstanding 
as to the attitude of the United States, the Government of the 
United States announces to the Allied powers that it holds it to 
be the duty of belligerent powers to distinguish between sub-
marines of neutral and belligerent nationality, and that responsi-
bility for any conflict that may arise between belligerent warships 
and neutral submarines on account of the neglect of a belligerent 
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to so distinguish between these classes of submarines must rest 
entirely upon the negligent power." (Ibid., p. 771.) 
The Nether lands Government took a position similar 
to that o£ the United States on the Allied 1neinorandu1n. 
The Norwegian and other governments forbade the en-
trance o£ submarines except on surface and flying na-
tional flag. The regulations were changed £ro1n time to 
time. 
Disregard of neutral obligations.-According to ar-
ticle 1 o£ XIII Hague Convention respecting the rights 
and duties o£ neutral powers in maritime war: 
Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign rights of neutral 
Powers and to abstain, in neutral territory or neutral 'vaters, 
from any act which would, if knowingly permitted by any Power, 
constitute a nonfulfillment of neutrality. 
The use o£ neutral "\Vaters £or warlike purposes would 
be in violation o£ the law o£ nearly all 1naritime states. 
It is a right o£ the neutral that neutral territory be 
respected. This right does not necessarily imply that the 
rights o£ belligerents as regards each other v\"·ould be 
entirely changed by the £act o£ their presence in neutral 
waters. Belligerents have often acted against each other 
in neutral waters. The arguments in support o£ such 
acts have varied. 
Violations of neutrality .-Sometimes there has been 
violation o£ neutral jurisdiction without intention or 
know ledge on the part o£ the actor. Before the princi-
pie o£ internment was generally recognized, the viola-
tion o£ neutral n1aritime jurisdiction was often argued 
to have been necessary as an act o£ self-defense because 
otherwise an ene1ny might take advantage o£ a sojourn 
in a neutral port to strengthen his forces in a 1nanner 
not recognized as within the neutral's power to prevent. 
'fhere were cases, particularly prior to the Russo-J apa-
nese War 1904-1905, when internment becan1e quite a 
general practice which shows that belligerents took nlat-
ters into their own hands. 
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Acts in marginal sea.-Some have proposed to allow 
in the marginal sea acts which are not directly hostile 
in their nature. Such acts might be illustrated by the 
:fueling or provisioning o:£ a belligerent ship. Those 
who. 'vould allow such acts 'vould :forbid positive hostili-
ties as the exercise o:£ the right o:£ visit or capture and o:£ 
course actual firing upon the enemy. N eutraljty which 
would permit the :fueling o:£ belligerent :forces in neutral 
waters without restriction would hardly meet the re-
quirements o:£ modern standards. A belligerent :force 
taking on :fuel outside o:£ neutral waters would be liable 
to attack :from the opposing :forces and would have to 
protect itself accordingly. Within neutral waters where 
hostilities bet,veen the belligerents are :forbidden :fueling 
1night go on almost as in time o:£ peace. The taking on 
o:£ the supply o:£ :fuel permitted under the rules o:£ neu-
trality has in general the limitation that it is permitted 
in order to enable the sh{p to keep the sea. The proposi-
tion o:f son1e o:f the advocates o:£ the doctrine which 
would allow :fueling at any time . without restriction 
within neutral waters beyond the port limits would up-
hold action on the part o:f a belligerent which in effect 
constitutes the neutral waters a base. Colliers and :fuel 
ships might await in safety in neutral waters the ar-
rival o:£ a fleet and the fleet might return repeatedly :for 
:fueling. 
It is admitted that a neutral could not ordinarily and 
should not be required to exercise the same measures 
to prevent violations o:£ neutrality in remote marginal 
seas and in ports. The supervision should be such as 
could reasonably be exercised without unduly throwing 
the burdens o:£ war on the neutral. 
The action o:£ a belligerent in using neutral jurisdic-
tion :for carrying on move1nents or undertakings which 
are o:£ hostile nature is contrary to the obligations owed 
by the belligerent to the neutral state. It is the aim 
o:£ the first article o:£ The Hague Convention XIII to pro-
hibit such conduct. The responsibility is placed upon the 
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belligerent to abstain fro1n acts \vhich kno\vingly per-
mitted by a neutral state \vould constitute a nonfulfill-
ment of their neutrality. The nature of the obligation 
may be seen from the comment in the report upon this 
Article I submitted at The Hague Conference in 1907. 
Le principe est applicable a la guerre continentale comme a 
la guerre maritime, et il ne faut pas s'etonner que le Reglement 
elabore par la Deuxieme Commission au sujet des droits et des 
devoirs des Etats neutres sur terre commence par cette dispo-
sition: "Le territoire des Etats neutres est inviolable." 
D'une n1aniere generale, les belligerants doivent s'abstenir dans 
les eaux neutres de tout acte qui, s'il etait tolere par l'Etat 
neutre, constituerait un manquement a la neutralite. II importe 
de remarqQer, d€s a present, qu'un devoir du neutre ne 
correspond pas necessairement a un devoir du belligerant et 
cela est confor1ne a la nature des choses. On peut imposes au 
belligerant !'obligation absolue de s'abstenir de certains actes 
dans les eaux de l'Etat neutre; il lui est aise, et, dans tous les 
cas, possible de satisfaire a cette , obligation, qu'il s'agisse des 
ports ou des eaux territoriales. On ne peut, au contraire, 
imposer a l'Etat neutre !'obligation de prevenir ou de reprimer 
tous les actes que voudrait faire ou ferait un belligerant, parce 
que tres souvent l'Etat neutre ne sera pas en situation de 
remplir une pareille obligation. II peut ne pas savoir tout ce 
qui se passe dans ses eaux et il peut n'etre pas en etat de 
l'empecher. Le devoir n'existe que dans la mesure ou on peut le 
connaitre et le remplir. Cette observation re~oit son application 
dans un certain nombre de cas. 
On a parfo·s a se demander s'il y a lieu de distinguer entre les 
ports et les ea ux territoriales : la distinction se co1nprend en ce 
qui concerne les devoirs du neutre, qui ne peut etre au meme degre 
responsable de se qui se- passe dans les ports soumis a ·!'action 
directe de ses il;Utories ou dans ses eaux territoriales, sur lesquelles 
il n'a souvent qu'un faible contrOle; la d~stinction ne se comprend 
pas pour 1e devoir du belligerant, qui est le meme partout. 
(Deuxien1e Conference de la Paix, Tome I, p. 297.) 
Opinion of lJfr. Adams on 81tpply of coal.-The opin-
ion of Mr. Charles Francis Adams before the Geneva 
Arbitration Tribunal covered the general subject of sup-
ply of coal. 'fhe principles enun(l.iated may for the most 
part apply to the supply of any kind of fuel. As the 
summary presented by Mr. Adams covers various phases 
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of the question of use of base for supplies, it may be some-
·what fully presented: 
This question of coals was little considered by writers on the 
law of nations, and by sovereign powers, until the present cen-
tury. It has become one of the first importance, now that the 
motive-power of all vessels is so greatly enhanced by it. 
The effect of this application of steam-power has changed the 
character of war on the ocean, and invested with a greatly pre-
ponderant force those nations which possess most largely the 
best material for it within their own territories, and the greatest 
nu1nber of maritime places over the globe where deposits may 
be conveniently provided for their use. 
It is needless to point out the superiority in this respect of the 
position of Great Britain. There seems no way of discussing the 
question other than through this example. Just in proportion to 
these advantages is the responsibility of that country when hold-
ing the situation of a neutral in time of war. 
The safest course in any critical e1nergency would be to deny 
altogether to supply the vessels of any of the belligerents, except 
perhaps when in positive distress. 
But such a policy would not fail to be regarded as selfish, il-
liberal, and unkind by all belligerents. It \Vould inevitably lead 
to the acquisition and establishment of similar positions for them-
selves by other maritime powers, to be guarded with equal ex-
clusiveness, and entailing upon them enormous and continual 
expenses to provide against rare emergencies. 
It is not therefore either just or in the interest of other powers, 
by exacting severe responsibilities of Great Britain in time of 
war, to force her either to deny all supplies, or, as a lighter risk, 
to engage herself in war. 
It is in this sense that I approach the arguments that have 
been presented in regard to the supply of coals given by Great 
Britain to the insurgent American steamers as forming a base of 
operations. 
It must be noted that, throughout the war of four years, sup-
plies of coal were furnished liberally at first, and more scantily 
afterward, but still indiscriminately, to both belligerents. 
The difficulty is obvious how to distinguish those cases of coals 
given to either of the parties as helping them impartially to other 
ports, from those furnished as a base of hostile operations. 
Unquestionably, Commodore Wilkes, in the Vanderbilt, was very 
much aided in continuing his cruise at sea by the supplies ob-
tained from British sources. Is this to be construed as getting a 
base of operations? 
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It is plain that a line must be drawn somewhere, or else no 
neutral power will consent to furnish supplies to any belligerent 
whatever in time of war. 
So far as I am able to find my way out of this dilemma, it is in 
this wise: 
The supply of coals to a belligerent involves no responsibility 
to the neutral, when it is made in response to a demand pre-
sented in good faith, with a single object of satisfying a legiti-
mate purpose openly assigned. 
On the other hand, the same supply does involve a responsi-
bility if it shall in any way be made to appear that the concession 
was made, either tacitly or by agreement, with a view to promote 
or complete the execution of a hostile aret. 
Hence I perceive no other way to determine the degree of the 
responsibility of a neutral in these cas~s, than by an exa,mina-
tion of the evidence to show the intent -of the grant in any spe-
cific case. Fraud or falsehood in such a case poisons everything 
it touches. Even indifference may degenerate into willful negli-
gence, and that will impose a burden of proof to excuse it before 
responsibility can be relieved. 
This is the rule I have endeavored to apply in judging the 
nature of the cases complained of in the course of this arbitra-
tion. (Papers relating to the treaty of Washington, vol. 4, p. 
148.) 
Opinion of Sir Alexande"r Oockburn.-The position o£ 
Mr. Adams was criticised by one o£ the British repre-
sentatives, sitting on the tribunal. He said: 
But a novel and, to my mind, most extraordinary proposition is 
now put forward, namely, that if a belligerent ship is allo,ved to 
take coal, and then to go on its business as a ship of \Var, this is 
to make the port from which the coal is procured " a base of 
naval operations," so as to come within the prohibition of the 
second rule of the treaty of Washington. 
\Ve have here another instance of an attmnpt to force the 
words of the treaty to a meaning which they were never-at least 
so far as one of the contracting parties is concerned-intended to 
bear. It would be absurd to suppose that the British govern-
Inent, in assenting to the rule as laid down, intended to a(hnit 
that whenever a ship of 'var had taken in coal at a British 
port and then gone to sea again as a war-vessel, a liability for all 
. the mischief done by her should ensue. Nor can I believe that 
the United States Government had any such a7Tiere pensee in 
fran1ing the rule; as, if such had been the case, it is impossible 
to suppose that they would not have distinctly informed the 
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Briti sh goYernment of the extended application they proposed to 
give to the rule. 
The rule of international law, that a belligerent shall not 
n1ake neutra~ territory the base of hostile operations, is founded 
on the principle that the neutral territory is inviolable by the 
belligerent, and that it is the duty of the neutral not to allow 
his territory to be used by one belligerent as a starting-point for 
operations against the other. This is nowh~re better explained, 
as regards ships of war, than by 1\1. Ortolan, in the following , 
passage: 
"Le principe general de l'inviolabilite du territoire neutre exige 
aussi que l'emploi de ce territoire reste franc de toute 1nesure 
ou moyen de guerre, de l'un des. belligerants contre l'autre. 
C'est une obligation pour chacun des belligerants de s'en abstenir; 
c'est aussi un devoir pour l'etat neutre d'exiger cette abstention; 
et c'est aussi pour lui un devoir d'y veiller et d'en maintenir 
!'observation a l'encontre de qui que ce soit. Ainsi il appartient 
a l'autotite qui commande dans les lieux neutres, ou des navires 
belligerants, soit de guerre, soit de commerce, ont ete re~us, de 
prendre des mesures necessaires pour que l'asile accorde ne tourne 
pas en machination hostile contre l'un des belligerants; pour 
empecher specialement qu'il ne devienne un lieu d'ou les bati-
Jnents de guerre ou les corsaires surveillent les navires ennemis 
pour les poursuivre et les combattre, et les capturer lorsqu'ils 
seront parvenus au-delii. de la mer territoriale. Une de ces 
mesures consiste a e1npecher la sortie simultanee des navires 
appurtenant a des puissances ennemies l'une de l'autre.1 " 
It must be, I think, plain that the words "base of operations" 
must be accepted in their ordinary and accustomed sense, as 
they have hitherto been understood, both in common parlance 
and among authors who have written on international law. 
Now, the term "base of warlike operations" is a military term, 
and has a well-known sense. It signifies a local position which 
serves as a point of departure and return in military operations, 
and with which a constant connection and communication can 
be kept up, and which may be fallen back upon whenever neces-
sary. In naval warfare it would mean something analogous-
a port or water from which a fleet or a ship of war might watch 
an enemy and sally forth to attack him, with the possibility of 
falling back upon the port or water in question, for fresh supplies 
or shelter, or a renewal of operations. (Papers relating to treaty 
of "\Vashington, vol. 4, p. 422.) 
1 Diplomatie de la mer, vol. i, p. 291. 
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Later speaking of the supply of coal the Shenandoah 
'vas allo,ved to take in ~1elbourne, Sir Alexander Cock-
burn said: 
But it is said that by taking in coal at 1\Ielbourne, with the 
ulterior purpose of making \Var on the whaling vessels of the 
United States, this vessel \Vas enabled to make the port of 1\Iel-
bourne a "base of naval operations." 
As I have already observed, when the la\v on this subject \vas 
under discussion, the application of such a rule in favor of 
the United States to the prejudice of Great Britain would be a 
flagrant injustice, seeing that, as I then showed, ships of \var 
of the United States obtained. many thousand tons of coal, under 
exactly the same circumstances, that is to say, \Vhen they had 
particular "naYal operations" in immediate view. If this doc-
trine is to hold, every time a vessel, having a particular belliger-
ent purpose in vie,v, takes in coal, and proceeds on such purpose, 
the port will at once be converted into a base of naval operations. 
The same reasoning \Vould of course apply, and in the same degree, 
to repairs. 
This proposition is, to 1ny n1ind, utterly unreasonable, as being 
altogether inconsistent \Yith any idea that ever has been. or 
properly can be, attached to the term "base of operations;" and 
is, moreoYer, in the most flagrant degree unjust, if it is to have 
the effect of imposing on the neutral any responsibility to the 
other belligerent. For it is obviously inconsistent with comn1on 
justice that the neutral state shall suffer for that to which it is 
not only no party, but of which it bas also no knowledge. By the 
common practice of nations, as well as by the regulations of the 
government, a belligerent vessel is allowed to haYe the benefit of 
necessary repairs, and to take a supply of coal without the local 
government being entitled to inquire into her ulterior destination. 
No such inquiry is prescribed by the regulations in question, or 
by those made by any other nation; nor has any publicist ever sug-
gested that such a proceeding should be adopted. No such inquiry 
could, with propriety, be made; nor could the commander of the 
ship be called upon to answer it if made. The knowledge of his 
intended course might expose hiln to the attack of an enen1y. 
No such question, so far as I a1n aware, \Vas ever put to a bellig-
erent vessel during the whole course of the war. None such was 
ever put to a ship of the United States when applying for coal at 
a British port. This being so, to say that, the local goYernn1ent 
being in ignorance of the destination of the vessel, a responsi-
bility is to be incurred because the belligerent, in obtaining this 
accommodation, has an ulterior operation in view, as to which, by 
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some violent distortion of language, the port 1nay be said to be thus 
rendered a base, but of which ulterior operation the neutral 
knows nothing, a}1pears to me to be an outrage not only of the 
first principles of justice, but also upon the plainest dictates of 
common sense. (Ibid., p. 498.) 
Consideration in 1912.-The Naval "\Var College con-
sidered the question of base 'vith particular reference 
to coaling in the conferences of 1912. It 'vas stated that 
under the circun1stances specified where one belligerent 
govern1nent protests against furnishing coal to naval 
colliers of the opponent in a neutral port, the neutral 
state should heed the request. In this case it was kno,vn 
that such coal had been furnished and the protest was 
against the continuance of the practice. In referring to 
the conception of base under such circumstances it was 
said: 
The word " base " had been used in many senses. It is often 
couvled with some other word which 1nodifies its meaning. The 
1nost common exr1ression is "base of con1n1unications," though 
" base of supplies," " base of cominunications " and other expres-
sions are used. The Inodifying words are differently interpreted. 
The use of neutral territory by a belligerent as a base in the 
sense of a place in which a belligerent 1nay habitually prepare to 
wage war n1ore effectiyely against his enemy, fit out expeditions, 
take refuge, or establish a rendezvous. is usually regarded as con-
trary to, or a violation of neutrality. The Hague Convention rela-
1 ive to the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Maritime 'Var 
proYides at the outset that the belligerent shall not tlH6W all 
obligation upon the neutral, saying: 
"Article I. Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign 
rights of neutral powers and to abstain, in neutral territory or 
neutral waters, from any act which would, if knowingly per-
Initted by any power, constitute a nonfulfillment of neutrality." 
(1912, Naval 'Var College, International Law Situations, p. 153.) 
Danish order, 1912.-In the Danish order of Decem-
ber 20, 1912, there were provisions 'vhich were quite in 
detail in regard to the use by belligerents of national 
'vaters. Even the possibility of the establishing of fuel 
depots in Danish 'vaters was foreseen. In part 4, para-
graph 2, it 'vas provided: 
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It is prohibited to organize fuel depots on Danish territory or 
on vessels staying in Danish territorial \Vaters. '(1916, Naval 
\Var College, International La'v Topics, p. 52.) 
Opinion of Professor Holland.-Professor Holland of 
Oxford University, in 1913, president of the Institute 
of International Law, wrote during the Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904-5 in regard to furnishing coal to the Rus-
sian fleet. He mentions that ordinary commerce be-
tween neutrals and belligerents is not terminated by war, 
and that this commerce even in articles of contraband 
may be subject only to the risks of war. He further says: 
It by no means follows that British shipowners may charter 
their vessels "for such purposes as following the Russian fleet 
with coal supplies." Lord Lansdo·wne's recent letter to 1\Iessrs. 
"\Voods, Taylor and Brown is explicit to the effect that such con-
duct is " not permissible." Lord Lansdowne naturally confined 
himself to answering the question which had been addressed by 
those gentlemen to the Foreign Office; but the reason for his 
answer is not far to seek. The unlawfulness of chartering British 
vessels for the purpose above mentioned is \vholly unconnected 
with the doctrine of contraband, but is a consequence of the in-
ternational duty, \Vhich is incumbent on every neutral State, of 
seeing that its territory is not made a base of belligerent opera-
tions. The question was thoroughly threshed out as long ago as 
1870, when l\Ir. Gladstone said in the House of Commons that 
the Government had adopted the opinion of the law officers-
" That if colliers are chartered for the purpose of attending 
the fleet of a belligerent and supplying it \Vith coal, to enable 
it to pursue its hostile operations, such colliers \Vould, to all 
practical purposes, become store-ships to the fleet, and would be 
liable, if within reach, to the operation of the English law under 
the (old) Foreign Enlistment Act." 
British colliers attendant on a Russian fleet \Vould be so un-
deniably aiding and abetting the operations of that fleet as to 
give just cause of complaint against us to the Government of 
Japan. The British shipper of coal to a belligerent fleet at sea, 
besides thus laying his Government open to a charge of neglect of 
an international duty, lays himself open to criminal proceedings 
under the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870. By section 8 (3) and 
( 4) of that Act, " any person within H. M. Dominions " who 
(subject to certain exceptions) equips or despatches any ship, with 
intent, or knowledge, that the same \Vill be employed in the 
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military or naval service of a foreign State, at war with any 
friendly State, is liable to fine or imprisonment, and to the for-
feiture of the ship. By section 30, "naval service" covers "user 
as a store-ship," and "equipping" covers furnishing a ship with 
" stores or any other thing which is used in or about a ship for 
the purpose of adapting her for naval service." Our Government 
has, therefore, ample powers for restraining, in this respect, the 
use of its territory as a base. It has no power, had it the wish 
(except for its own protection, under a different statute), to 
restrain the export of contraband of war. 
It would tend to clearness of thought if the term "contraband" 
were never emplo~'ed in discussions with reference to prohibition 
of the supply of ·coal to a belligerent fleet at sea. (Letters on 
'Var and Neutrality, p. 93.) 
Award of the t1'ibunal.-The a'vard of the Geneva 
Tribunal referring to coaling stated that "in order to 
impart to any supplies of coal a character inconsistent 
'vith the second rule, prohibiting the use of neutral ports 
or waters, as a base of naval operations for a belligerent, 
it is necessary that the said supplies should be connected 
with special circumstances of time, of persons, or of 
place, which may combine to give them such character." 
( 1 Moore, International Arbitrations, p. 57 4.) 
Restatement of rule.-The rule of the treaty of Wash-
ington, 1871, in regard to the use of a neutral port or 
waters as a base of operations was restated in the 
American case as follows : 
The second Rule provides that a neutral government is bound 
not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its 
ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, 
or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military 
supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men. 
A question has been raised whether this rule is understood 
to apply to the sale of military supplies or arms in the ordinary 
course of commerce. The United States do not understand that 
it is intended to apply to such a traffic. They understand it to 
apply to the use of a neutral port by a belligerent for the re-
newal or augmentation of such n1ilitary supplies or anns for the 
naval operations referred to in the rule. Taken in this sense, 
the United States maintain that the same obligations are to be 
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found, (expressed in other words,) first, in the Foreign Enlist-
ment Act of 1819; and, secondly, in the instructions to the na Yal 
forces of Great Britain during the rebellion. 
The Tribunal of Arbitration will not fail to observe the breadth 
of this rule. 
The ports of waters of the neutral are not to be made the base 
of naval operations by a belligerent. Vessels of war may come 
and go under such rules and regulations as the neutral may pre-
S<;!ribe; food and the ordinary stores and supplies of a ship, not of 
a warlike character, may be furnished without question, in quan-
tities necessary for immediate wants; the moderate hospitalities 
which do not infringe upon impartiality may be extended; but no 
act shall be done to make the neutral port a base of operations. 
Ammunition and military stores for ,cruisers cannot be obtained 
there; coal cannot be stored there for successive supplies to the 
same vessel, nor can it be furnished or obtained in such supplies; 
prizes cannot be brought there for condemnation. The repairs 
that humanity demand can be given, but no repairs should add to 
the strength or efficiency of a vessel, beyond what is absolutely 
necessary to gain the nearest of its own ports. 
In the same sense are to be taken the clauses relating to the 
renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms and the 
recruitment of men. As the vessel enters the port, so is she to 
leave it, without addition to her effective power of doing injury 
to the other belligerent. If her magazine is supplied with powder, 
shot, or shells; if new guns are added to her armament; if pistols, 
or muskets, or cutlasses, or other implements of destruction, are 
put on board; if men are recruited; even if, in these days when 
steam is a power, an excessive supply of coal is put into her 
bunkers, the neutral will have failed in the performance of its 
duty. (1, Papers, treaty of Washington, p. 70.) 
Supplies.-In the discussions during the Geneva Ar-
bitration there were many claims and counterclain1s. 
The United States (thought) that-
British territory was, during the whole struggle, the base of 
the naval operations of the insurgents. The first serious fight 
hud scarcely taken place before the contracts were made in Great 
Britain for the Alabama and the Florida. The contest was nearly 
over when Waddell received his orders in Liverpool to sail thence 
in the Lau.reZ in order to take command of the Shenandoah and to 
visit the Arctic Ocean on a hostile cruise. 
There also was the arsenal of the insurgents, from whence they 
drew their munitions of war, their arms, and their supplies. It 
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is true that it has been said, and may again be said, that it was 
no infraction of the law of nations to furnish such supplies. But, 
while it is not tnaintained that belligerents n1ay infringe upon 
the rights which neutrals hav~ to manufacture and deal in such 
military supplies in the ordinary course of cmnmerce, it is as-
serted with confidence that a neutral ought not to permit a bellig-
erent to use the neutral soil as the main if not the only base of 
its military supplies, during a long and bloody contest, as the 
soil of Great Britain was used by the insurgents. (1, Papers 
relating to the treaty of 'Vashington, p. 125.) 
British 1?eply.-To the statement made by the United 
States as to the interpretation o£ the second rule o£ the 
treaty o£ "\Vashington the British countercase makes 
reply: · 
According to this interpretation a neutral goYernment which 
should suffer a belligerent cruiser to effect repairs beyond what 
are absolutely necessary for gaining the nearest of its own ports, 
or to receive more coal than \vould be enough for the same pur-
pose, would commit a breach of neutral duty. It n1ay, indeed, 
sometimes be found convenient by neutral powers to in1pose re-
strictions of this nature, n1ore or less stringent, on the armed ves-
sels of belligerents adtnitted into their ports; and this was done 
by Great Britain during the civil war. But such restrictions were 
not then, and are not no\v, dictated by any rule of international 
obligation. 'Vere they to become such, and \vere the obligation 
to be construed against the neutral with the breadth and rigor 
for \Vhich the United States contend, it may be feared that neu-
tral powers would rarely be secure against complaints and de-
mands for compensation on the part of one . belligerent or 
another. 
Having constantly during the war used British ports as places 
of resort for its own cruisers, and having repeatedly obtained for 
them therein successive supplies of coal, \Vhich were consumed, not 
in returning home, but in cruising, the Government of the United 
States no\v appears to represent this very act as a breach o.f 
neutral duty, and to hold Great Britain liable for any cases in 
which confederate vessels may have succeeded in obtaining simi-
lar facilities. 
This question, however, does not regard Great Britain alone. 
The Government of the United States has plainly declared that 
it regards these rules as no more than a statement of previously 
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established rules of international law.2 So far as regar(ls the 
fecond rule I-Ier Britannic l\1ajesty's government concurs in th:s 
view. The expressions upon which the United States rely belong 
to a class in common use among publicists, who, in attempting 
to define the duties of neutrality, are accustomed to en1ploy these 
'vords or others equivalent to them, and of not less extensive 
Ineaning. Thus the phrase, "base of naval operations," em-
ployed in this connection, denot~s the use of neutral territory by 
a belligerent ship as a station or point of departure, 'vhere she 
may await and from whence she may attack her enemy. That 
these expressions have not hitherto received the construction 
which the United States ·would put upon them is certain. 'Vhether 
they are to receive it in future is a question which concerns not 
Great Britain only, but all other powers which may hereafter find 
themselves neutral in maritime warfare. (Two papers, treaty of 
Washington, p. 221.) 
Self-defense, the "Oaroline."-In 1841, Mr. Webster, 
Secretary o:f State, in a communication to Mr. Fox, 
British Minister, said: 
It is admitted that a just right of self-defence attaches always 
to nations as 'vell as to individuals, and is equally necessary 
for the preservation of both. But the extent of this right is a 
question to be judged of by the circumstances of each particular 
case; and when its alleged exercise has led to the commission of 
hostile acts within the territory of a power at peace, nothing less 
than a clear and absolute necessity can afford ground of justifica-
tion. (6, Webster's vVorks, p. 255.) 
Further, referring to the destruction o:f the 0 aroline 
by the British, Mr. Webster said : 
It will be for that government to show a necessity of self-
defence, instant, over,vhelming, leaving no choice of means, and 
no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to show, also, that 
the local authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of 
the moment authorized the1n to enter the territories of the 
United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since 
the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited 
by that necessity, and kept clearly within it. (Ibid., p. 261.) 
2 Case of the United States, pp. 148, 149. See also p. 162,. and the 
President's message to Congress, Dec. 4, 1871. "The contracting parties in 
the treaty have undel'ltaken to regard as between themselves certain prin-
ciples of public law, for which the United States have contended from the 
commencement of their history. They have also agreed to bring those 
principles to the knowledge of the other maritime powers, and to invite 
them to accede to them." 
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"'\'Thile l\Ir. 'Vebster's position in 184± is taken as a 
correct state1nent of the la 'v, the strain of 'var has put it 
to seYere test. Naturally 'vriters in belligerent countries 
during and in11nediately after the "'\iV orld War were dis-
posed to find reasons for supporting acts of their national 
or allied forces. This 'vas often Inani:fest in regard to 
the attitude to,vard ne'v agencies of 'varfare such as the 
sub1narine and aircraft, but·the principles of la'v are not 
dependent upon the agencies as has been shown fron1 
early times 'vhen new :forn1s o:f 'vea pons 'vere vie·w·ed 
'vith disfavor or even prohibited. The early object o:f 
'"ar to conquer the ene1ny 'vas gradually superseded by 
the object of bringing the enemy to tern1s, and later to 
bring the enen1y to terms 'vith the least loss of life and 
property, and then to bring the enemy to terms 'vith the 
least loss of life and property 'vithout unnecessary 
suffering. 
/:.:elf-defense, general.-As a basis of international la'v 
the right of states to exist is ackno,vledgecl. A state 1nust 
therefore have the right to defend its existence. In de-
fending its existence, it must recognize the right of other 
states to exist. As bet,veen belligerents in time o:f war 
this Inutual recognition of the right of existence is tenl-
porarily suspended except as involved in conduct con-
forinable to the la,vs of w·ar. The existence of 'var 
should not, ho,vev·er, iinperil the existence of states 'vhich 
are neutral and not parties to the 'var. That neutral 
states 1nay be inconvenienced by war is entirely possible 
and that neutral and belligerent rights may at ti1nes be 
in conflict is also possible. This is recognized in the in-
terference 'vith conunerce as in blockade, contraband 
. ' 
and other admitted 'var practices. 
Quite different is an act of vvar 'vithin neutral juris-
diction. Such acts are prohibited because a neutral n1ay 
be responsible for acts which take place within its juris-
diction, and in recent years it has been held that a neu-
tral state is bound to use due diligence to prevent such 
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acts. Due diligence has been interpreted as the use of 
the 1neans at the disposal of the neutral state. 
If in the presence of an adequate neutral force of a 
coastal state, a 1nuch inferior belligerent force should be 
per1nitted to attack or to capture in the neutral jurisdic-
tion an opponent's merchant vessel, the neutral's duty 
'vould not be fulfilled. If, hovvever, on a remote neutral 
coast such an attack or capture should be made, the neu-
tral obligation might be slight. In both cases the bellig-
erent's obligation 'vould be the same. If a belligerent 
submarine should suddenly appear in neutral waters in a 
position which apparently immediately threatentd its 
opponent's fleet, there might be a ground for action 
against the submarine as in self-defense. 
SOLUTION 
(a) ( 1) The aircraft of X should not attack the sub-
Inarine of Y unless on grounds other than 1nere presence 
of the sub1narine in the strait of R. 
(2) 'rhe presence of the cruiser of State R vvould make 
it n1ore imperative that any attack by the aircraft of X 
upon the submarine of Y should be based upon son1e hos-
tile act of the sub1narine of Y. 
(b) State R should intern the vessels of State X if 
they are or have been using the waters of R as a base. 
0 onclusions.- (a) From practice of states and fron1 
accepted rules at present (1) a belligerent is under obli-
gation to refrain within neutral jurisdiction fro1n any 
act 'vhich, if knowingly per1nitted by a neutral, "'rould be 
a nonfulfillment of neutrality; (2) any 'varlike act. 
against an enemy 'vithin neutral jurisdiction is a Yiola-
tion of international law; (3) reparation for such an act 
is due to the neutral state; ( 4) the netttral n1ay be under 
obligation to the injured belligerent if due diligence has 
not been used though; ( 5) the act 1nay be Yalid as. 
bet·ween the belligerents. 
As to Situation II it may be said that (a) ( 1) the sub-. 
1narine of State Y is conforming to the general require-
Inent that submarines in neutral 'vaters navigate upon 
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the surface. The aircraft of State X is flying within 
neutral jurisdiction \vhich in general is contrary to neu-
trality. The sub1narine of Y if conforming to the laws 
of R has the san1e right in the strait as the fleet of X. 
'fhe fact that it is in a favorable position to attack the 
fleet of X gives the force of X no right to attack the 
submarine of Y nor does the submarine have any right 
to attack the fleet of X. 
(2) The fact that a cruiser of State R is near would 
not change the relative rights of the belligerents, but 
'vould be an evidence that State R proposed to main-
tain its neutrality and that the forces of X and Y \vere 
to that degree more secure as regards each other. 
(b) This land of State R consisting of islands not 
1nore than 6 n1iles apart in the area in \vhich the vessels 
of State X are refueling incloses open water 7 n1iles 
fro1n any of the islands. 
It has been generally held that such \Vater is analogous 
to a bay and the surrounding state has over it exclusive 
jurisdiction. 
Consequently the refueling is taking place 'vithin the· 
jurisdiction of State R. 
The aircraft Y can not lawfully traverse the air above· 
this area but if it makes its observation from the high_ 
seas, it con1mits no violation of R's neutrality and even 
if it does, that in no 'vay changes the obligations of 
StateR. 
'fhe refueling to peace capacity of full bunkers not. 
n1ore often than once in three months in a neutral port. 
is usually permitted, but under supervision of port: 
authorities . 
.• :-\..t the point 7 miles from any land, the port authori-
ties, if any, \vould not ordinarily be exercising super-
v-ision because the com1nercial vessel \Vould not have en-
tered port and would not have deposited its papers. 
The demand of the aircraft of State Y is correct, and 
State R should intern the vessels of State X if they are 
or have been using its waters as a base. 
